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The Shadow Payment System
Dan Awrey and Kristin van Zwieten
Banking, derivatives, and structuredfinance may attract the lion's share ofaccolades
and approbation in global finance-but payment systems are where the money is.
Historically, payment systems in most jurisdictions have been legally and operationally
intertwined with the conventional banking system. The stability of these payment systems
has thus parasitically benefited from the unique prudential regulatory strategies imposed
on deposit-taking banks. These strategies include emergency liquidity assistance or
"lender of last resort" facilities, deposit guarantee schemes, and special bankruptcy or
"resolution" regimes for failing banks. Importantly, these strategies have the practical
effect of relaxing the strict application of corporate bankruptcy law, thereby enabling
banks-and the payment systems embedded within them-to continue to perform their core
payment and other functions even under conditions ofsevere institutional stress.
Recent years have witnessed the emergence ofa vibrant, diverse, and rapidly growing
shadow payment system. This system includes peer-to-peer payment systems such as
PayPal, mobile money platforms such as M-Pesa, and crypto-currency exchanges uch as
Mt. Gox. The defining feature of this shadow payment system is that the financial
institutions that populate it perform the same core payment functions as banks, but without
benefiting from the prudential regulatory strategies that ensure bank-based payment
systems can continue to function during periods of institutional stress. This Article
examines the potential risks to both customers and broader financial and economic
stability generated by this functional gap, along with the likely effectiveness of various
strategies that institutions within the shadow payment system currently-or might in the
future-employ to address these risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Banking, derivatives, and structured finance may attract the lion's share of accolades
and approbation in global finance-but payment systems are where the money is. Effective
payment systems are vital to the smooth and efficient operation of the modem economy.
Whenever your employer deposits your salary into your bank account, whenever you use
your debit or credit card to purchase goods or services, and whenever you write a cheque
to your landlord or to pay a bill, you are invariably relying on one or more payment systems
to complete the transaction. Collectively, these payment systems facilitate over $400
trillion in non-cash transactions per year: roughly five times global gross domestic
product.I Accordingly, while we often take for granted the important functions that
payment systems perform within the global financial and economic system, there are few
parts of this system that have a more direct impact on our daily lives.
Historically, payment systems in most jurisdictions have been legally and
operationally intertwined with the conventional banking system. Banks accept deposits
from households and firms in exchange for a promise to pay back deposited savings, along
with any accrued interest, on demand. These deposits are credited to accounts that serve as
the backbone of a complex institutional architecture that facilitates non-cash payments
among and between households, firms, and governments. This architecture typically
includes a network of correspondent accounts that banks hold with one another, along with
one or more interbank clearing and settlement systems. Residing at the apex of this
architecture is then a central bank such as the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, or
European Central Bank that issues the ultimate settlement asset, oversees the functioning
of the payment system and, importantly, stands ready to provide liquidity during periods
of institutional or systemic stress.
The defining feature of banks is that they invest deposited savings in loans and other
longer term investments.2 The resulting mismatch between their short-term liquid liabilities
1. See STEFAN DAB ET AL., Bos. CONSULTING GRP., GLOBAL PAYMENTS 2014: CAPTURING THE NEXT
LEVEL OF VALUE 5 (2014), http://image-
src.bcg.com/Images/Global Payments_2014_NextLevelValue Sep_2014_tcm9-82816.pdf (estimating global
payment volumes for 2013 at $410 trillion, excluding payments facilitated by non-bank intermediaries and
payment systems). For a country-by-country breakdown of payment statistics in larger developed countries, see
COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT INFRASTRUCTURES, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICS ON PAYMENT,
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE CPMI COUNTRIES - FIGURES FOR 2015 (2016),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/dl52.pdf.
2. This is reflected in the legal definition of a "bank" in most jurisdictions. In the European Union, for
example, a "credit institution [bank] means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account[.]" (emphasis added). European
Parliament and Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 4.1(1), 2013 O.J. (L. 176) 1 (EU). There are several definitions
of a "bank" under U.S. law. For example, a bank is defined as "an institution organized under the laws of the
United States . . .which both-(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check
or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and (ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial
loans." U.S. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B) (2016) (emphasis added). Section
a(2)(A) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in contrast, defines a state bank as "engaged in the business of
receiving deposits, other than trust funds" without a corresponding requirement that they also be engaged in the
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(demand deposits) and longer term and potentially illiquid assets (loans) renders banks
susceptible to destabilizing runs by depositors and other short-term creditors.3 In order to
minimize the risk of institutional and broader financial instability-and to effectively
manage this instability should it arise-bank regulators have developed a range of
prudential regulatory strategies.4 These strategies include emergency liquidity assistance
or "lender of last resort" facilities, deposit guarantee schemes, and special bankruptcy or
"resolution" regimes for failing banks. Importantly, these strategies often have the practical
effect of relaxing the strict application of the general corporate bankruptcy law regimes
that apply to virtually all other types of distressed firms; thereby enabling banks-and the
payment systems embedded within them-to continue to perform their vital payment,
investment, and other functions even under conditions of severe institutional stress. To
address the resulting moral hazard problems, bank regulators then subject banks to
intensive prudential supervision and impose capital, liquidity, and other regulatory
requirements designed to constrain socially excessive risk-taking.5
Technological innovation is rapidly changing the way we make payments. To see
how, you need only go to a grocery store, use public transit, or sell your old sofa on eBay.
Perhaps most importantly, while banks and bank-based payment systems still dominate the
financial landscape in most jurisdictions, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a
vibrant, diverse, and rapidly growing shadow payment system. This shadow payment
system includes peer-to-peer (P2P) payment systems such as PayPal, mobile money
platforms such as Kenya's M-Pesa, and crypto-currency exchanges such as Mt. Gox.6
business of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(A) (2016). These definitions are typically
accompanied by entry restrictions prohibiting all firms other than banks from issuing deposit liabilities. See, e.g.,
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2016). At the same time, of course, this conventional narrative of financial
intermediation-pursuant to which banks fund loans through deposit liabilities-is at best incomplete (if not
somewhat inaccurate) insofar as many deposits are actually created through the extension of loans by banks to
firms and households. See Michael McLeay et al., Money Creation in the Modern Economy, BANK OF ENG. Q.
BULL. 14, 14 (2014), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2014/money-
creation-in-the-modem-economy.
3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON.
401, 401 (1983) (discussing "risks which lead to a demand for liquidity" that can lead to bank runs). For a recent
survey of the literature on the fragility of banks, see Franklin Allen et al., Moral Hazard and Government
Guarantees in the Banking Industry, I J. FIN. REG. 30 (2015). For a description of how banks can be vulnerable
to runs by short-term creditors other than depositors, see Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking
and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012).
4. These regulatory strategies are described in greater detail later in this Article, see infra Part VI.
5. At the international level, the development of these prudential standards takes place under the auspices
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); see, e.g., BCBS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL Ill: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (June
2011), www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl 89.pdf; BCBS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE VERSION,
(June 2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdf. For a more detailed overview of these requirements, see JOHN
ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION CH. 14-17 (2016).
6. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. There are many other elements of the shadow payment system,
and new institutions and business models are emerging at a rapid pace. Given the differences between the business
models used in the shadow payment system, there are clearly a range of taxonomies that could be used to organize
or categorize system providers. These differences in business models will be important insofar as they have a
bearing on the appropriateness of the strategies that may be used to enhance the credibility of a payment system
2018] 777
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Despite this diversity, the financial institutions that populate the shadow payment system
share two core features. First, these institutions perform the same core payment functions
as conventional deposit-taking banks: combining the acceptance of funds7 (storage) with
the promise to transfer8 or convert these funds on demand (liquidity).9 Second, these
institutions reside outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system.10 As a result,
these institutions do not directly benefit from the prudential regulatory strategies that
ensure that bank-based payment systems can continue to function during periods of
institutional stress. Accordingly, while these institutions may seem like potentially
promising substitutes for bank-based payment systems, the conditions under which they
can credibly commit to simultaneously provide their customers with both storage and
liquidity are often limited by the strict application of general corporate bankruptcy law.
The rapid changes in the way we make payments have significantly outpaced our
understanding of the potential risks stemming from the emergence and growth of the
shadow payment system. This Article seeks to make up this lost ground by identifying and
examining the risks that the shadow payment system poses to customers, along with those
it may in the future pose to financial and economic stability. As we shall see, these risks
are a product of the fundamental disconnect between the shadow payment system's core
storage and liquidity functions (which generally resemble the payment functions of
conventional deposit-taking banks outside periods of institutional stress) and its current
legal and regulatory treatment in many jurisdictions (which in a great many cases does not).
Just because we don't call something a "duck" doesn't mean we should eliminate the
possibility that it might quack.
The risks that the shadow payment system poses to customers flow principally from
provider's commitment to provide storage and liquidity. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is not
necessary to do more than note that the providers that we survey all perform the same core payment functions,
and it is this common feature that attracts our interest. See infra Part II.
7. The nature of these "funds" varies across the payment systems we survey. They may be legal tender,
currency, or other "base" money issued by central banks (e.g. notes, coins, and central bank reserves), demand
and other short-term deposits held with conventional banks, or other privately-issued assets that are used as
effective substitutes for base money and/or bank deposits (e.g. crypto-currencies). For the purposes of this Article,
we refer to all of these assets as "funds" while acknowledging their diverse characteristics.
8. The mechanics of this "transfer" will again vary across payment systems. These differences reflect the
variation in the nature of the asset being deposited, the terms of the relationship between customers and the system
provider, and the law that governs these terms. In some systems, customers will be able to effect a transfer by
assigning their claim to the return of the funds they have deposited to a third party, thereby effecting payment to
that third party. In other systems, transfers may have to take effect through the system provider, for example by
the customer instructing the provider to debit the customer's account (or "wallet") and to take steps to credit (or
enable another system provider to credit) a transferee with a claim of equivalent value, such that in legal terms
there is not strictly a "transfer" but instead the extinction of one claim and the creation of one or more new ones;
see CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 189 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing bank transfer
analogs). For the purposes of this Article nothing turns on these differences, except to the extent that they have a
bearing on the question of whether claim holders have any proprietary interest in funds held by the payment
system provider, or merely hold an unsecured claim to the payment of funds.
9. The core payment functions of bank-based and shadow payment systems are examined in greater detail
in infra Part II.
10. There are of course many "alternative" payment systems that are authorized as banks in one or more
jurisdictions (e.g. WorldPay). By definition, these systems do not qualify as "shadow" payment systems as we
have defined this term.
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the prospect of delayed conversion or transfer of funds (illiquidity) and the potential write-
down of these funds where they are characterized as unsecured liabilities in the context of
any bankruptcy proceeding (loss of value). These risks were vividly illustrated by the
failure of the crypto-currency exchange Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in
the United States and Japan in early 2014 with over $USD470 million in missing assets.1
While some of these assets have reportedly since been located, customers will still likely
be required to wait until the conclusion of the bankruptcy process before receiving
repayment-a process that has already taken several years and at this stage remains
ongoing. It is also highly likely that customers will ultimately receive only a small fraction
of the funds they originally entrusted to Mt. Gox.
While perhaps not an immediate threat, the emergence of the shadow payment system
also poses potentially significant risks to financial and economic stability. These risks flow
from three principal sources. First, as an increasing number of micro and small
enterprises-from online merchants to Kenyan coffee growers-come to rely on the
shadow payment system as their primary means of making and receiving payments, there
is a corresponding risk that the failure of institutions within this system could jeopardize
the liquidit and, ultimately, solvency of an important cross-section of firms within the real
economy. Through this channel, institutional instability within the shadow payment
system could have an adverse impact on economic growth and employment. Second, as
the shadow payment system continues to grow and evolve, the pressure to generate profits
may drive institutions to bundle payment functions with more conventional forms of
financial intermediation: combining their promise of storage and liquidity to customers
with investments in longer-term and potentially illiquid assets.13 The resulting maturity
and liquidity mismatches would raise the prospect of destabilizing runs by customers and
other short-term creditors. Through this channel, correlated runs within the shadow
payment system could lead to a contraction in the money supply, thereby driving a
contraction in investment and economic growth. Finally, as an increasing proportion of
funds become held by institutions outside the conventional banking system, this may
undercut the ability of central banks to use existing monetary policy tools to manage the
money supply in pursuit of price stability, financial stability, and other policy objectives.14
At present, each of these potential systemic risks is somewhat speculative: the shadow
payment system has simply not achieved sufficient scale to pose a clear and present danger
to financial or economic stability. Nevertheless, identifying potential risks at this early
stage can enhance our understanding of how best to approach the design and regulation of
this increasingly important component of the financial system.
Having identified the risks stemming from the emergence of the shadow payment
system, this Article goes on to examine a range of strategies for minimizing their harmful
effects. Given the functional parallels, it might seem tempting to subject institutions within
11. The failure of Mt. Gox is chronicled in greater detail in Part V.
12. As described in greater detail in Part V, this will especially be the case where firms use the shadow
payment system for working capital purposes.
13. As described in greater detail in Part V, this trend can arguably already be observed in the case of PayPal
and mobile money platforms.
14. These tools, along with their use within the context of the conventional banking system, are described
in greater detail in Part V.
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the shadow payment system to the same prudential regulatory strategies that are currently
imposed on conventional deposit-taking banks. Ultimately, however, the diversity of
business models within the shadow payment system-combined with the absence of
meaningful levels of financial intermediation in many cases-points in favour of a more
nuanced approach. Just because something quacks doesn't mean that we should necessarily
call it a duck.
For this reason, our examination proceeds on the basis of first principles. The
strategies we examine include portfolio restrictions, third-party insurance, outsourcing the
storage function to deposit-taking banks, and utilizing trusts to ring-fence customer funds.
As we shall see, while these strategies are not without their potential merits, no one
approach on its own is likely to fully address the risks generated by the bundling of storage
and liquidity functions outside the regulated banking system. Moreover, in choosing
between these strategies, market participants and policymakers face important trade-offs
between consumer and systemic protection, financial innovation, and competition within
the payment system. Accordingly, this Article also examines the effectiveness of a
seemingly underappreciated strategy-the structural separation of payment functions
from other business activities-as a way of minimizing the risks generated within the
shadow payment system without undercutting its unique and potentially transformative
benefits. Inevitably, however, even this strategy entails potentially significant trade-offs in
terms of the ability of the shadow payment system to serve as a platform for other types of
socially useful financial intermediation.
This Article holds out a number of important and related insights. First, the ability of
banks to simultaneously provide both storage and liquidity-especially during periods of
institutional and systemic stress-is a function of the unique prudential regulatory regimes
to which they are subject. Historically, the stability of bank-based payment systems has
thus parasitically benefited from the regulatory regimes designed to ensure the stability of
banks. Second, and as a corollary, the recent emergence of institutions that provide storage
and liquidity outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system-i.e. the shadow
payment system-poses potentially significant risks to customers. While somewhat less
immediate, the continued growth of the shadow payment system could also pose potential
systemic risks. Third, while strategies exist that may serve to protect customers and reduce
potential systemic risks, these strategies do not at present appear to be widely utilized
within the shadow payment system. We should acknowledge, however, that it is often
extremely difficult to obtain reliable information about the legal and other institutional
features of these systems. This suggests that much work remains to be done to construct a
more accurate map of the shadow payment system. Finally, and more broadly, this Article
highlights the important role of law and legal institutions in supporting liquidity and
stability within the financial system. Collectively, these insights provide us with a useful
starting point for building a more effective and resilient shadow payment system.
It is also important to clarify from the outset some of the insights that this Article is
not designed to yield. First and foremost, this Article does not examine whether the
emergence and growth of the shadow payment system is socially desirable, or evaluate
whether payment systems are in general better positioned within the perimeter of the
regulated banking system or outside it. While these are undoubtedly important questions,
we would expect the answers to be heavily dependent on the relevant business models,
780 [Vol. 43:4
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along with the patterns of financial development, the quality of legal and regulatory
regimes and institutions, and the prevailing political systems within individual
jurisdictions. What works in the United States may not work in Kenya and vice versa.
Second, this Article does not provide policymakers with a detailed blueprint for how to
design or regulate the shadow payment system. Rather, our objective is to identify a range
of policy options or strategies that might be used to enhance the effectiveness and resilience
of these systems, along with the associated trade-offs. Once again, the optimal approach to
the design and regulation of the shadow payment system will ultimately depend on the
specific business models and the prevailing economic, legal, and political environment
within any one jurisdiction.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins by identifying the core functions of
modem payment systems, focusing specifically on the combination of storage and liquidity
offered by institutions within both the conventional banking and shadow payment systems.
Part II also frames the fundamental legal and public policy challenge stemming from the
simultaneous provision of storage and liquidity in the shadow of general corporate
bankruptcy law. Part III traces the parallel origins of banking and payment systems in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Continental Europe, demonstrating that the
historical development of payment systems in these jurisdictions has been legally and
operationally intertwined with the development of banks. Bringing this historical analysis
forward to the present day, Part IV describes the core features of modem payment systems
in these jurisdictions. These features include a network of commercial banks and interbank
clearing and settlement systems ubject to sophisticated prudential regulatory regimes,
along with a central bank that stands ready to provide liquidity to these institutions during
periods of institutional or broader systemic instability. Part V then turns its attention toward
the emerging shadow payment system: examining the business models of P2P payment
systems, mobile money platforms, and crypto-currency exchanges, along with the risks
stemming from the bundling of storage and liquidity functions outside the perimeter of the
regulated banking system. Part VI concludes by identifying and examining the likely
effectiveness of various strategies that institutions within the shadow payment system
currently-or might in the future-employ to address these risks.
II. THE CORE FUNCTIONS OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Payment systems can be defined as the institutional arrangements that facilitate the
transfer of funds from debtors (payors) to creditors (payees) in satisfaction of financial
obligations.15 Broadly speaking, these institutional arrangements fall into two categories.
The first category is comprised of wholesale payment systems that facilitate the flow of
funds between banks and other financial institutions and, in some cases, between these
institutions and their large commercial clients. The category of wholesale payment systems
15. Bruce Summers, The Payment System in a Market Economy, in THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN,
MANAGEMENT, AND SUPERVISION 1 (1994) ("The payment system, which consists of the set of rules, institutions,
and technical mechanisms for the transfer of money. . ."); MARK MANNING ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF LARGE-
VALUE PAYMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS 3 (2009) ("[A]ny organized arrangement for transferring value between
parties can be defined as a payment system."); ANDREW HALDANE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS
(2007).
7812018]
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can be further broken down into: large value-typically interbank-clearing and settlement
systems; forei n currency, derivatives, and other clearinghouses; and centralized securities
depositories. The second category is comprised of retail payment systems that facilitate
the flow of funds among and between businesses, households, and governments. Retail
payment systems include those facilitating the use of debit and credit cards, automated
teller machine (ATM) networks, cheques, and electronic fund transfers. While
conceptually distinct, wholesale and retail payment systems are often highly
interconnected from an operational perspective. As described in greater detail in Part IV,
one of the most common points at which the operation of these systems intersect is within
the conventional banking system.
Payment systems are often held out as performing a number of important and socially
useful economic functions. Professor Hal Scott, for example, argues that effective retail
payment systems exhibit several key features. These features include: universality (i.e. the
ability to transfer funds at both point of sale and remotely); ease of use (including
widespread acceptance by merchants); certainty of payment (subject to some degree of
payment reversibility for mistaken payments); liquidity; recordkeeping; safety and
security; and financial inclusion.17 While often articulated in somewhat different terms,
these same features have been identified by a number of other scholars and policymakers.18
Ultimately, this list of features can be distilled down to two core economic functions:
storage and liquidity.19 The storage function has two components. The first component is
the protection of customer funds from loss, theft, and destruction in the period preceding
their use to make a payment (custodial storage). While a bank vault is perhaps the
archetypal example of a mechanism for ensuring custodial storage, the idea that funds are
physically "stored" in a bank or other financial institution is increasingly antiquated.20
Instead, most custodial storage today takes place on the electronic accounting systems of
these institutions. The second component is the safe and secure transfer of stored funds to
third parties (transactional storage). Like custodial storage, an increasing proportion of
transactional storage today takes place electronically in the form of debit and credit card
transactions, standing orders, and other electronic fund transfers.21
16. For a more detailed overview of each of these subcategories of wholesale payment systems, see
ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 18.
17. See Hal Scott, The Importance of the Retail Payment System (Dec. 16,2014), (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2539150.
18. See, Summers, supra note 15, at 2-7; Charles Kahn & William Roberts, The Economics of Payment
Finality, 87 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REv. (2002),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/publications/economic-review/2002/q2/vol87no2_economics-of-payment-
finality.aspx; Fighting Poverty, Profitably: Transforming the Economics of Payments to Build Sustainable,
Inclusive Financial Systems, GATES FOUND. (Sept. 2013),
https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/documents/fighting%20poverty%2profitably%20fu1l%20report.pdf.
19. With the exception of financial inclusion, the achievement of which is not inherent in the performance
of core storage and liquidity functions. A payment system can offer storage and liquidity on terms that still exclude
the poor.
20. Economist Milton Friedman notably disliked the use of the word "storage" to characterize this function
for precisely this reason; see MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960 (1971) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, MONETARY HISTORY].
21. For an overview of payment trends in the United States, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 2016 (Dec. 22, 2016),
782 [Vol. 43:4
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All payment systems provide some form of custodial and transactional storage. These
payment systems then combine this storage with the promise of liquidity. As explained by
Hal Scott, liquidity in this context refers to "the ability of an asset to be used immediately
and without delay to perform basic economic activities such as purchases of products and
services and repayment of debt."22 Where an institution within the payment system accepts
cash or other equivalent assets in exchange for a claim against the institution,23 liquidity
also encompasses the ability of the customer to convert that claim back into cash or cash
equivalents upon demand. The hallmark of perfect lituidity is thus the ability of a party
to transfer or convert an asset rapidly and for full value. Illiquidity, then, arises whenever
a party experiences a delay in transferring or converting an asset or where transferring or
converting that asset within a short timeframe requires the party to accept a price below its
full value.
The simultaneous provision of storage and liquidity is the essence of what banks
promise to their depositors. As we shall see, this same promise resides at the heart of the
shadow payment system. Importantly, however, the combination of these core payment
functions presents a fundamental legal and public policy challenge. This challenge stems
from the treatment of assets stored within these payment systems in the event that one or
more of the institutions through which the systems perform these functions enters into
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of an institution within the payment system will, in many
cases, trigger the commencement of a formal bankruptcy process. While there is obviously
significant variation in corporate bankruptcy law regimes around the world, two common
features of these regimes are a procedural rule suspending enforcement action against
assets held by the debtor26 and a substantive rule under which unsecured creditors share in
any subsequent distribution of the debtor's assets on a pro rata basis.27 All other things
being equal, we would expect the application of these procedural and substantive
bankruptcy rules to have an impact on both the timeframe within which claim holders can
expect to receive repayment and, insofar as they are treated as unsecured creditors, the
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-study-20161222.pdf.
22. Scott, supra note 17, at 40; see also Summers, supra note 15, at 2 (referring to this function as
"timeliness").
23. This will typically be the case for both mobile money platforms and proprietary P2P payment systems.
See Part V. The position in relation to crypto-currency exchanges is more complex, as these institutions may be
designed to serve as mere conduits for the transfer of currencies/crypto-currencies, such that the customer (rather
than the exchange) is the (intended) owner of the crypto-currency held within the system.
24. Indeed, in many cases we would expect this convertibility to be a prerequisite to the willingness of third
parties to accept the transfer of the claim on the institution as payment. Simultaneously, of course, it is also
possible to imagine a "cashless" society in which all payments were made electronically within the payment
system itself For a description of the potential benefits of a (near) cashless payment system and a proposal for
how to go about achieving it, see KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (2016).
25. For an in-depth discussion of liquidity more generally, see Markus Brunnermeier & Lasse Pedersen,
Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12939, 2007),
https://www.nber.org/papers/wl2939.pdf.
26. PHILIP WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY § 9-051 (2d ed. 2007). The inclusion of
secured creditors within the stay may be necessary to facilitate a value-maximising deployment of the debtor's
assets; see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 182-83 (1986).
27. Except to the extent that they enjoy some priority or preferential status under the applicable law; WOOD,
supra note 26, at § 29-039.
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value that they ultimately receive. Importantly, even customers who enjoy a proprietary
interest in assets held by the debtor-who we might otherwise expect to escape the impact
of the substantive bankruptcy rule-may suffer significant delays in accessing these assets
during the bankruptcy process by operation of the procedural rule. In other words, the legal
treatment of stored funds in the event of an institution's bankruptcy will have a direct
impact on the credibility of its commitment to provide liquidity during periods of
institutional stress.
In Parts IV and VI, respectively, we examine the legal and regulatory strategies
utilized within both the conventional banking and shadow payment systems to address this
fundamental challenge. First, however, we must seek to better understand why this fairly
basic insight regarding the impact of corporate bankruptcy law on the credibility of a
payment system's commitment to perform its core economic functions has been largely
unexplored within the existing academic and policy literature. In our view, the answer
stems at least in part from the fact that the development of modern payments systems in
many jurisdictions has been deeply intertwined with the development of the conventional
banking system. In order to lay the groundwork for our subsequent analysis, we therefore
begin by tracing the parallel development of modem banking and payment systems.
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BANK-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEMS
The history of payment systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Continental Europe is the history of banking and banks. The deeply intertwined
development of these systems has meant that scholars and policymakers have been able to
effectively disregard the fundamental legal and policy challenge described in Part II, safe
in the knowledge that prudential regulatory strategies designed to enhance the stability of
banks would also necessarily enhance the credibility of a bank's commitment to perform
its core payment functions. This Part traces the parallel development of these systems. In
the process, it not only provides us with the historical backdrop to the recent unbundling
of the conventional banking and payment systems, but also an explanation for why we have
yet to fully grapple with the risks stemming from the emergence and growth of the shadow
payment system.
The origin of modem payment systems is often traced back to the development of the
Italian banking system in the early twelfth century.28 Notarial records dating from 1200
describe Genoese bankers as enabling their wealthy clients to make payments by means of
book transfers on the accounts of the bank.29 A merchant could thus make payment by
directing his bank to debit his account and credit that of his agents, suppliers, or other
creditors-provided, of course, that these creditors held an account at the same bank. These
records also suggest the xistence of relatively informal interbank arrangements facilitating
28. See BENJAMIN GEVA, THE PAYMENT ORDER OF ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES: A LEGAL
HISTORY 354 (2011); Robert Lopez, The Dawn Of Medieval Banking, in THE DAWN OF MEDIEVAL BANKING
(UCLA ed., 1979); Jean-Frangois Bergier, From the Fifteenth Century in Italy to the Sixteenth Century in
Germany: A New Banking Concept?, in THE DAWN OF MEDIEVAL BANKING (UCLA ed., 1979). At the same time,
there is a strong case to be made that these practices may have been imported from the Middle East and Asia.
29. See ROBERT REYNOLDS, A Business Affair in Genoa in the Year 1200: Banking, Bookkeeping, a Broker
anda Lawsuit, in STUDI DI STORIA E DIRITTO IN ONORE DI ENRICO BESTA (1938).
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payments between accounts held at different banks.30 This same basic system of accounts,
book transfers, and informal interbank payment arrangements was subsequently adopted
by the Venetian banking system of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries,31 and
eventually spread throughout much of Western Europe.32
In reality, of course, the institutions of medieval Continental finance were not
generally known as "banks." Nor in many cases did these institutions perform all of the
functions that we today associate with the business of "banking." Instead, medieval
financiers broadly fell into two categories: merchant bankers and money changers.33
Merchant bankers were initially large commodity merchants-first of Italian and later
German origin34 -with extensive correspondent networks throughout Europe. Amongst
their many important functions, these bankers combined lending and remittance services:
extending credit in one geographic location and currency with the expectation that it would
be repaid in another location and in another currency.
The principal instrument through which these services were provided was the
cambium or letter of payment. Letters of payment were a written acknowledgement by a
borrower of funds received, and a corresponding direction to the borrower's foreign agent
to repay these funds to the lender's foreign agent at a specified time, location, -and
denominated currency. The borrowed funds were typically used by the borrower to
purchase goods locally that were then destined for export and sale by the borrower's
foreign agent at the location stated in the letter of payment. Upon receipt, the lender's
foreign agent would present the letter to the borrower's foreign agent for acceptance and,
upon maturity, repayment.36 The borrower's agent would then discharge the repayment
obligation out of the proceeds generated from the sale of the goods. The lender's agent
could then remit the repaid amounts back to the lender by entering into a reverse letter of
payment with a local merchant looking to purchase goods for export to the location at
which the original lender was resident. Merchant bankers could also settle outstanding
obligations at exchange or payment fairs often held in parallel with the Champagne and
other fairs at which the goods were sold and, later, at commercial centers such as Florence,
Bruges, Geneva, and London.37 In effect, medieval merchant bankers combined trade
financing, foreign exchange, and payment services.38 In this and other important respects,
merchant bankers were thus the forerunners of modem investment banks. The
30. Id.; GEVA, supra note 28, at 359. As described in greater detail below, these interbank payments were
essentially handled through accounts that bankers held with one another.
31. See id.; Reinhold Mueller, The Role qf Bank Money in Venice, 1300-1500, 3 STUDI VENEZIANI 47
(1979).
32. GEVA, supra note 28, at 359.
33. Id. at 355. A third category-pawnbrokers-played little or no role in the payment system. In practice,
these categories were not mutually exclusive, with many institutions acting as both money changers and merchant
banks. Id.
34. See Bergier, supra note 28.
35. GEVA, supra note 28, at 356.
36. Id. at 379-80.
37. Id. at 382.
38. Id. at 356.
39. See generally ALAN MORRISON & BILL WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS,
AND LAW (2007) (describing how these medieval institutions evolved into modem day investment banks).
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institutional arrangements through which merchant banks provided these services-
namely, letters of payment and exchange fairs-were also the precursors of modem bills
of exchange and formal interbank clearing and settlement systems.40
Medieval money changers, in contrast, were engaged in the business of accepting
deposits and investing deposited funds.41 As part of the deposit-taking process, money
changers would assess the quality-i.e. the authenticity and metal content-of deposited
coins and other currency and then credit the deposit holder's account with an amount based
on their assessment of its intrinsic value.42 Money changers then enabled deposit holders
to execute book transfers from their accounts to those of other deposit holders.43 Book
transfers between deposit holders with accounts at different money changers, meanwhile,
were settled through networks of accounts that money changers held with other money
changers.44 Medieval money changers thus performed an important custodial and
transactional storage function in an age where coins and other physical payment
instruments were vulnerable to counterfeiting and debasement.
Following several high-profile scandals involving money changers during the
sixteenth century, public confidence in these institutions began to ebb, and authorities in
many European countries intervened in the marketplace.45 In many cases, this intervention
involved the creation of a public bank to provide deposit and other payment services. One
of the first such public banks was the Bank of Amsterdam. The Bank of Amsterdam was
created in 1609 with a public guarantee from the City of Amsterdam.46 Coins and bullion
deposited in the Bank were credited to the account of the depositor in bancoflorin-a unit
of account representing the value of a standardized light coin.47 The Bank would then
facilitate book transfers between florin-denominated accounts, with settlement aking place
daily and on a multilateral basis.48 Similar public banks were established throughout
western Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gradually squeezing many
private money changers out of the marketplace.49 These public banks would play an
important role in the continental payment system until the end of the eighteenth century,
before being supplanted by a series of institutional innovations that would together lay the
foundations for the modern payment system.
If continental Europe is the birthplace of the modem bank, the United Kingdom is the
40. See GEVA, supra note 28, at 387-417 for a more in-depth discussion of the historical development and
legal issues surrounding both letters of payment and bills of exchange.
41. Id. at 356.
42. Mueller, supra note 31, at 48.
43. For this reason, money changers were often called "transfer bankers." GEVA, supra note 28, at 356.
44. Id. at 359-61.
45. Raymond de Roover, New Interpretations of the History of Banking, in BUSINESS, BANKING AND
ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE: SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF RAYMOND
DE ROOVER 219 (Julius Kirshner ed., 1974) [hereinafter de Roover, New Interpretations]. Public authorities also
intervened out of concerns that the deposit-taking activities of money changers threatened the integrity of ducal
mints and coins. GEVA, supra note 28, at 365.
46. The creation of the Bank of Amsterdam was accompanied by a prohibition against money changers;
GEVA, supra note 28, at 364. While the prohibition was lifted in 1621, money changers were henceforth required
to be licensed and maintain accounts with the Bank. Id.
47. Id. at 366.
48. Id. at 367.
49. de Roover, New Interpretations, supra note 45, at 223.
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birthplace of the modem banking system. The origins of this system can be traced back to
the activities of a small community of London goldsmiths. Prior to the English Civil War
(1642-51), the business of these goldsmiths consisted mainly of the manufacture of gold
and silver plate and jewelry, along with the purchase and sale of precious jewels.50 In this
capacity, goldsmiths were often called upon to assess the purity of gold and silver coins.
During the Civil War, the business of goldsmiths expanded to include the storage of this
coinage for safekeeping.51 By the late seventeenth century, the role of goldsmiths in
providing for the safety and security of deposited funds had evolved into one in which they
enjoyed full legal authority to use these funds to extend credit to the public.52 This small
community of London goldsmiths had thus stumbled upon the business model that would
eventually become synonymous with the business of banking: combining deposit-taking
with the extension of loans to businesses and households.
This Goldsmiths' system, as it came to be known, combined several features of the
Continental system of merchant banks and money changers. First, as just described,
goldsmiths accepted deposits of coins and precious metals. They were also engaged in the
business of discounting bills of exchange and promissory notes.53 Goldsmiths would then
issue receipts-or notes-to their depositors as documentary evidence of their deposits.
These bank notes were payable either to the payee or to the bearer of the receipt.54 In both
cases, the notes represented the goldsmiths' undertaking to repay deposited funds on
demand when presented with the receipt.55 Depositors could also request drafts in any
amount up to the full value of their deposit made payable to either the bearer or an identified
payee. These drafts were the predecessors of modem cheques.56 Both bank notes and
cheques were payment instruments enabling the transfer of payment from debtors to
creditors. In the case of bank notes, these instruments also came to possess a relatively high
degree of transferability, thus enabling the holder of a note to exchange it for other goods
and services. Final settlement would then take place when the provider of the goods and
services, or a subsequent transferee, returned the note to the issuing bank-in effect
demanding that the bank honor its obligation to deliver the deposited funds. These
privately-issued bank notes were the precursor to modem fiat currency issued by central
banks.57
50. J. MILNES HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 71 (1955); GEVA,
supra note 28, at 473.
51. JAMES ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW 119 (1995); GEVA, supra note 28, at 474.
52. RICHARD RICHARDS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANKING IN ENGLAND 37 (1965); GEVA, supra note 28,
at 475.
53. Bills of exchange evolved out of the letters of payment utilized by medieval Continental merchant
bankers. See generally RAYMOND DE ROOVER, L'EVOLUTION DE LA LETTRE DE CHANGE: XIVE-XVtIIE SIECLES
(Armand Colin ed., 1953); GEVA, supra note 28, at 369-418. The Goldsmiths' system enabled the payee of a bill
to obtain finance by endorsing the bill in exchange for its present value. GEVA, supra note 28, at 475.
54. Id. at 476.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 476-77; HOLDEN, supra note 50, at 206-10.
57. The transferability of bank notes was initially contentious as a matter of law. On the one hand, courts
often took notice of the fact that these notes "could pass freely from hand to hand in payment of debts." Tassell
& Lee v. Lewis (1701) 91 Eng. Rep. 1397-98 (KB). On the other, the application of the "conditional payment"
principle under English law meant that these notes were not in all cases accepted as final payment of a debt. Ward
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A second important feature of the Goldsmiths' system was its network of
correspondent relationships facilitating the clearing and settlement of payments between
banks. Initially, this network consisted of little more than individual banks maintaining a
record of cheques drawn and cashed with other banks.59 Settlement would then take place
periodically on a bilateral basis, with the net debtor paying the net creditor in coins or other
specie.60 Over time, however, this network took on a more formal institutional structure.6 1
In the early 1770s, a number of large London banks rented a room on Lombard Street in
the City of London where their clerks would meet to clear and settle payments.62 By 1775,
clearing and settlement were taking place on Lombard Street on a daily basis.63 In 1841,
the bilateral system was replaced with a multilateral one, thereby reducing the overall
volume and size of payments.64 And in 1888, member banks officially established the
London Clearing House.65 These and other developments would be replicated in New
York, Paris, and other financial centers over the course of the nineteenth century.66
The third, and in some respects most important, institutional innovation of the
Goldsmiths' system was the creation of what was arguably the world's first modem central
67bank. Established in 1694, the Bank of England was originally incorporated by statute in
order to facilitate the extension of a loan to the government for the purpose of financing its
war against France.68 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Bank of England was the
United Kingdom's only joint-stock bank and had been appointed as banker to the
government.69 By the early eighteenth century, it had also been appointed as the principal
agent for the issuance and circulation of short-term government securities.70 The Bank
modeled itself on the operations of the goldsmiths: accepting deposits of coin and other
specie and issuing notes to depositors. Given its status as a joint-stock bank and close
relationship with the government, however, Bank of England notes gradually overtook
Goldsmiths' notes as a source of paper money.7
v. Evans (1702) 92 Eng. Rep. 120 (KB). This problem would not be fully resolved until the creation of the Bank
of England (see Quinn, infra note 58).
58. See generally Stephen Quinn, Balances and Goldsmith-Bankers: The Co-ordination and Control of
Inter-Banker Debt Clearing in the Seventeenth-Century, in GOLDSMITHS, SILVERSMITHS, AND BANKERS 53-76
(David Mitchell ed., 1995).
59. GEVA, supra note 28, at 494.
60. Id.
61. See WILLIAM LAWSON, THE HISTORY OF BANKING 215 (2d ed. 1885) (providing a more detailed
description of the transition to a more formal structure); PHILLIP MATTHEWS, THE BANKERS' CLEARING HOUSE:
WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES 9 (Pitman & Sons ed. 1921); id. at 494-95.
62. GEVA, supra note 28, at 495.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The London Clearing House survives to this day as LCH, although it no longer serves as a cheque
clearing and settlement system. LCH, http://www.lchcleametlch.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
66. GEVA, supra note 28, at 496.
67. While the Sveriges Riksbank is older, its operations did not initially resemble those of a modem central
bank. For example, the Riksbank was not permitted to issue notes until 1701.
68. RICHARDS, supra note 52, at 132-88; HOLDEN, supra note 50, at 87-88.
69. GEVA, supra note 28, at 486.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 485; HOLDEN, supra note 50, at 87-88. The Bank of England's advantage was compounded by
the fact that the ability of private bankers to issue notes was temporarily revoked between 1708 and 1826 and
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The Bank of England also came to play a central role within the evolving clearing and
settlement system. By 1770, Bank of England notes had supplanted coin and other specie
as the preferred settlement asset within the interbank clearing and settlement network.72
Beginning in May of 1854, settlement of payments through what would become the
London Clearing House took place via the accounts of member banks held with the Bank
of England.73 By the end of the nineteenth century, the Bank of England was thus firmly
entrenched at the heart of the United Kingdom's money, banking, and payments systems.
The Goldsmiths' model was replicated across Western Europe, largely supplanting
the system of public banks such as the Bank of Amsterdam. This model also had a
significant influence on the development of banking and payment systems in The New
World. Elements of the Goldsmiths' model appeared in the United States as early as
1690.74 These first proto-banks issued promissory notes to depositors, typically secured
against real property or precious metals.75 As in the United Kingdom, these notes
ultimately came to possess a degree of transferability and circulated widely as a form of
paper money (although typically at a discount to their par value).76 The first conventional
deposit-taking, note-issuing bank was likely the Bank of Pennsylvania, created in 1780 to
raise finance for the American Revolutionary War (1775-83).77 This was quickly followed
by the creation of the first Bank of North America, which received the first federal bank
charter on May 26, 1781. Robert Morris, the United States Superintendent of Finance at
the time, advocated for the creation of the Bank of North America on the grounds that it
would help stimulate investment in the real economy and, thereby, enhance government
tax revenues.79 Future Secretary of the United States Treasury Alexander Hamilton,
meanwhile, saw the Bank of North America as an opportunity to create what he described
as "a sufficient medium" of exchange.80 Put differently, Hamilton sought to develop a
banking system in order to support the development of a more robust system of money and
then permanently revoked in 1844; GEVA, supra note 28, at 489. The last private note issuing firm lost its power
to issue notes in 1921; Id. at 490. Bank of England notes were made legal tender under the Bank of England Act,
1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV c. 98 § 6. This was reaffirmed under the Currency and Bank Notes Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz.
11, c. 12.
72. GEVA, supra note 28, at 495.
73. Id. The clearinghouse would then distribute amounts to individual creditors by way of a cheques drawn
on its account at the Bank of England.
74. William Sumner, A History ofBanking in Leading Nations, I J. COM. & COM. BULL. 4 (1896) (citing
Trumbull Proc. Am. Antiq. Soc. 1884).
75. Id.
76. For a more detailed description of these systems, see Charles Calomiris & Larry Schweikart, The Panic
of 1857: Origins, Transmission and Containment, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 807 (1991); Gary Gorton, Free Banking,
Wildcat Banking and the Marketfor Bank Notes (Wharton Fin. Dep't., Working Paper, 1989); Charles Calomiris
& Larry Schweikart, Was the South Backward? North-South Differences in Antebellum Banking During Crisis
and Normalcy, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper, 1988).
77. Although, unlike conventional banks, the Bank of Pennsylvania was incorporated with a limited life;
Sumner, supra note 74, at 14.
78. Id. at 17. Sumner refers to the Bank of North America as the first "specie paying, convertible bank note
bank" in the United States.
79. Id. at 15.
80. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris 12 (Apr. 30, 1781),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1167.
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payments.
As Hamilton had hoped, federal and state chartered banks came to play an important
role in the nascent payment system. The Suffolk banking system offers an illustrative
example. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, notes issued by rural "country" banks
in New England circulated as currency in Boston alongside notes issued by local "city"
banks. Given the information, transportation, and other costs of redeeming these country
notes, they predictably circulated at a discount to their par value.82 Eventually, many
Boston banks simply refused to accept these notes. This presented a problem for Boston
merchants, who accepted country notes in the course of their trade but were then unable to
deposit them in their local Boston bank. Merchants were instead forced to exchange these
country notes for city notes through brokers, often at a considerable discount.83
Established in 1818, the Suffolk Bank was created by a group of influential Boston
merchants in order to address this problem.84 The Suffolk Bank committed to purchase the
notes issued by country banks at par. In exchange, country banks were required to maintain
permanent interest-free deposits with the bank, which in turn sorted deposited notes and
credited and debited the accounts of its member banks. Member banks were also required
to keep specie-gold and silver-with the Suffolk Bank and subjected to very basic
prudential supervision.85 The creation of the bank had the de sired effect: allowing city and
country notes to enjoy par convertibility within New England.86 By 1838, over 300 New
England banks redeemed their notes through the Suffolk Bank.87 During this same period,
a number of other private interbank clearing and settlement systems emerged elsewhere in
the United States.
The adoption of the National Banking Act, 186389 represented the beginning of the
end of this system of privately-issued bank notes.90 The principal objective of the National
Bank Act and subsequent legislation implementing what came to be known as the National
Banking System was to substitute private bank notes with a national currency "licensed,
81. See GEORGE TRIVOLI, THE SUFFOLK BANK: A STUDY OF A FREE-ENTERPRISE CLEARING SYSTEM 6
(1979). Similar systems existed in New York, Philadelphia, and other important commercial centers.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10.
85. David Whitney, for example, documents everal cases where the Suffolk Bank intervened to warn
member banks that they were extending too much credit or taking on too much debt. See DAVID WHITNEY, THE
SUFFOLK BANK 35-38 (1878).
86. See Charles Calomiris & Charles Kahn, The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payment Systems: Learning
from the Suffolk System, 28 J.MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 766, 780 (1996); Gorton, supra note 76.
87. TRIVOLI, supra note 81, at 11. The efficiency of the Suffolk banking system has been the source of
considerable debate. Some viewed it as a powerful rent-seeking monopoly, others as lending stability to an
otherwise chaotic system, thereby promoting greater trade. For a synthesis of this debate, see Calomiris & Kahn,
supra note 86.
88. This included systems in Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, and the Antebellum South, although the institutional
features and functions of these systems varied widely. See Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 86, at 4-5; Calomiris &
Schweikart, supra note 76.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1874).
90. For a detailed history of the composition of the United States' money supply during the relevant period,
see FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, MONETARY HISTORY, supra note 20.
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manufactured, and guaranteed by the federal government" 91 and issued by national banks.
National banks were licensed to issue a given quantity of notes backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States, while state and local bank notes were subject to a 10% tax.92
The National Bank Act thus effectively unbundled the activities of bank lending from note
issuance.93 Henceforth, the principal payment liabilities of banks took the form of chequing
accounts, with private interbank clearing and settlement systems emerging to facilitate this
form of payment instrument.94 The shift to the Goldsmiths' system would be completed
with the adoption of the Federal Reserve Act, 1913,95 establishing the Federal Reserve
System as the central bank of the United States, conferring upon it legal authority over note
issuance, and thus firmly entrenching it at the apex of the banking and payment system.
While the financial systems in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere would
continue to evolve over the course of the twentieth century, the high level of operational
integration between banking and payment systems would remain essentially intact.
The key insight from this brief historical overview is that the emergence and
development of the payment systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Continental Europe have been inextricably intertwined with the development of banks.
Scholars and policymakers examining the functions and operations of modem payment
systems have thus often taken for granted the fact that these systems are embedded within
the unique institutional and regulatory environment that characterizes modem banking
systems. In the next section, we describe how these deep historical connections are
reflected in the current structure of payment systems in these jurisdictions. We also
describe how deposit guarantee schemes, emergency liquidity assistance programs, special
resolution regimes, and other prudential regulatory strategies have a direct and significant
impact on the ability of bank-based payment systems to perform their important payment
functions. This then enables us to turn our attention in Part V to the emerging shadow
payment system: its operations, current legal and regulatory treatment, and the potential
risks arising from the combination of storage and liquidity functions outside the perimeter
of the regulated banking system.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN BANK-BASED PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Reflecting their historical roots in the development of the conventional banking
system, the structure of modem payment systems in most jurisdictions revolves around
three core institutions. The first institution is a central bank such as the Federal Reserve,
Bank of England, or European Central Bank. These central banks are endowed with the
exclusive authority to issue liabilities-bank notes, coins, and central bank reserves (often
referred to as "base" money)-that serve as the ultimate settlement asset within the
91. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 86, at 5.
92. For a contemporaneous discussion of the impact of the establishment of the National Banking System,
see SIMON NEWCOMB, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF OUR FINANCIAL POLICY DURING THE SOUTHERN
REBELLION 199-222 (1865). See also FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, MONETARY HISTORY, supra note 20, at 18-19.
93. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 86.
94. Id.
95. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1913).
96. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS, (9th ed., 2015). This "base" money can be contrasted
with "near" money, which includes the deposit liabilities of conventional banks; id.
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domestic banking and payment system. Deposit-taking banks then hold accounts with the
central bank, thereby enabling interbank payments to be cleared and settled via book
transfers on its accounts denominated in base money. As explained by Bruce Summers:
"The central bank is the logical final settlement authority because of its unique status as an
institution that does not pose credit or liquidity risks to its accountholders."
Residing directly beneath the central bank in most modem payment systems is a
network of private deposit-taking banks. As described above, some or all of these banks
will typically maintain accounts directly with the central bank for settlement purposes.
Others, however, may elect to settle interbank payments through correspondent accounts
held with banks that maintain an account with the central bank. Banks play several related
roles within these "tiered" banking systems. First, banks provide the basic account
architecture through which businesses, households, and governments make and receive
most payments. Second, they facilitate "in bank" payments from payors to payees with
accounts at the same bank.98 Where payors and payees hold accounts at different banks,
meanwhile, banks can clear and settle payments through the correspondent accounts they
hold with one another.99 Third, banks provide businesses and households with various
instruments for making non-cash payments. These payment instruments include debt and
credit cards, cheques, bank drafts, and various forms of electronic fund transfer.
Technological advances over the course of the last several decades have resulted in
an enormous increase in the volume of interbank payments.100 As the volume of payments
has increased, so too have the demands on the technological and administrative
infrastructure of both central banks and private bank correspondent networks. As a result,
a large proportion of interbank payments are now cleared through automated
clearinghouses before being routed to a central bank or private settlement agent for final
settlement.101 In these systems, banks periodically transmit batches of payment instructions
to a clearinghouse which, after sorting them and aggregating payments destined for the
same bank, then transmit information to each participating bank regarding the details of
payments to be made to their accountholders. As part of this process, the clearinghouse
may also calculate and transmit net positions to the central bank or private settlement agent.
Important clearinghouses include the Federal Reserve Wire Network (Fedwire), Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and Automated Clearing House (ACH) in the
United States, the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) and Bankers'
Automated Clearing Systems (BACS) in the United Kingdom, and TARGET2 in the
97. Summers, supra note 15, at 5.
98. Ultimately, this form of payment is little more than a series of book transfers on the bank's internal
accounting system.
99. Although, as described below, institutionally separate clearing and settlement systems have also
developed to facilitate interbank transfers.
100. For annual payment statistics collected by the CPMI, see Payment, Clearing and Settlement Statistics,
BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/statistics/payment stats.htm?m=3|16]385 (last visited Mar. 20,
2018).
101. Likewise, the increasing volume of payments cleared through clearinghouses has helped spur
technological advancements in clearinghouse design. Perhaps most importantly, it has helped spur the shift from
deferred net settlement to real-time gross settlement (RGTS) and, more recently, to hybrid RGTS systems; see
Morten Bech & Bart Hobjin, Technology Diffusion within Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross
Settlement, 3 INT'L J. CENT. BANKING 147 (2007) (discussing the increased use of RGTS systems).
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European Union.
Figure ] depicts the flow of funds within a stylized bank-based payment system, with
a central bank residing at the apex of a network of deposit-taking banks linked by an
interbank clearing and settlement system. In this example, the accountholder at Bank A
(the payor) receives an invoice for $100 and instructs her bank to pay an accountholder at
Bank B (the payee).102 This instruction is communicated to the clearinghouse, which
aggregates these payment instructions and communicates the net position as between Bank
A and Bank B to the central bank. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the $100 is
the only payment between accountholders at Bank A and Bank B over the relevant period.
As both Bank A and Bank B in our example hold accounts at the central bank, the $100 is
transferred from Bank A to Bank B through their respective accounts held with the central
bank. The transaction is then completed when Bank A debits $100 from the payor's account
and Bank B credits the payee's account the corresponding amount.
Figure 1: The Stylized Structure of a Modern Payment System
s Clearing House
Bank A Bank B
(payor's acon)(payee's account)
Paor receives invoice, instructs bank Paee issues inwice for 100
Viewed from this perspective, banks play a pivotal role within most modern payment
systems: providing businesses and households with both custodial and transactional storage
and liquidity. Indeed, in a very real way, a bank account has historically been a prerequisite
to gaining access to the payment system in many jurisdictions.
Crucially, the reliance of banks on short-term, liquid liabilities (e.g., deposits) to
finance the acquisition and holding of longer-term, potentially illiquid loans and other
financial assets renders these institutions vulnerable to destabilizing runs by depositors and
other short-term creditors.103 This vulnerability is typically framed in one of two ways.
102. This is a prototypical push payment. This form of payment can be contrasted with so-called pull
payments initiated by the payee.
103. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 3; Allen et al., supra note 3; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 3.
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The first views runs as a multiple equilibrium (or coordination) problem amongst short-
term creditors.104 Pursuant o this account, each creditor's decision about whether to run is
a function not only of their demand for liquidity and evaluation of the issuer's
creditworthiness but also-and crucially-their subjective perception of whether other
creditors are likely run.105 The second views runs as a product of the realization by short-
term creditors that assets that they previously believed to represent reliable stores of
nominal value-or moneyness -06 are in fact sensitive to the revelation of new
information about the creditworthiness of the issuer, the quality of any underlying
collateral, or other variables.107 Pursuant to this second account, rather than investing the
time and energy necessary to incorporate this new information into the price of these assets,
creditors may simply prefer to shift to less informationally sensitive substitutes that, in
effect, possess a higher degree of moneyness.108
The prudential regulatory regimes governing banks in most jurisdictions include a
range of strategies designed to minimize the probability and potential impact of
institutional instability stemming from this mismatch between a bank's short-term, liquid
liabilities and its longer term, illiquid investments. Three strategies in particular stand
out.109 The first is emergency liquidity assistance. Emergency liquidity assistance-or
lender of last resort-facilities exist as a backstop for banks that find themselves unable to
raise capital on private debt markets. Following Bagehot's dictum, these facilities empower
central banks to extend secured loans to solvent but illiquid banks in order to enable these
institutions to continue to meet their short-term liabilities to depositors and other creditors
during periods of institutional or broader financial instability. 110 These programs typically
enable banks to shift relatively illiquid loans and other assets to the central bank in
Notably, "liquidity" in this context-often referred to as "funding" liquidity-is different than that typically used
in the payment context. In the context of a liquidity mismatch, funding liquidity refers to the ability of a financial
institution to obtain funding for a given portfolio of assets. See Brunnermeier & Pedersen, supra note 25.
104. See, e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 3.
105. Id.
106. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, MONETARY STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES,
SOURCES, METHODS, AND DATA 151-52 (1970); JOHN HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 163 (2nd ed. 1946).
107. See, e.g., GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010);
Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working
Paper No. 479, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.pdf. The key difference between this and multiple
equilibrium views of run-like behavior is the absence of a coordination problem, i.e. creditors in this second view
do not switch in anticipation of the decisions of other creditors.
108. Id
109. While not discussed in any detail here, central banks may also provide intra-day and other liquidity
assistance to clearinghouses. See generally ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 18.
110. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 56 (1873)
(discussing periods of internal panic and external demand on the money market). Bagehot's dictum also prescribes
that this lending be extended at a penalty rate of interest and against adequate collateral. Id. at 57. The mechanics
of these facilities vary widely in practice. For a brief history of the development of these facilities, see generally
Thomas Humphrey, Lender ofLast Resort: The Concept in History, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. REV.
(1989) (outlining the third prong of the theory of the lender of last resort: accommodating sound but temporarily
illiquid institutions); Mark Carlson & David Wheelock, The Lender ofLast Resort: Lessons from the Fed's First
100 Years (Fed. Reserve. Bank of St. Louis, Working PaperNo. 2012-056B, 2013) (highlighting some challenges
that face a lender of last resort); ROSA LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND MONETARY LAW §§ 4.08-4.36
(2d ed. 2015) (explaining public international law and the role of central banks alongside other institutions).
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exchange for more liquid assets, such as government securities. These securities can
then be sold into the market to raise cash for the purposes of funding the bank's ongoing
liabilities-including, importantly, its liabilities to depositors.
The second strategy is deposit insurance. Deposit guarantee schemes come in a
number of different shapes and sizes. The basic strategy is to have a third party guarantee
a pre-determined fraction of depositors' funds in the event of bank failure. This third party
thus effectively steps into the shoes of the bank, honoring the bank's commitment to
provide depositors with both storage and liquidity during periods of institutional stress. I12
In order to make this commitment credible, the third party guarantee is typically provided
by the government in the jurisdiction in which the bank is established through institutions
such as the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). To make this commitment
truly effective, a deposit guarantee scheme must also commit to pay depositors on a timely
basis-ideally within a matter of days.113
The third strategy is the creation of special bankruptcy or resolution regimes for
failing banks. Whereas emergency liquidity assistance facilities are designed to support
solvent but illiquid banks, special resolution regimes are designed to restructure or wind
down the operations of banks that are at the risk of crossing-or have already crossed-
over the threshold into bankruptcy.114 Special resolution regimes provide bank regulators
with powerful tools in pursuit of this objective. These tools typically include the ability to
write-down specified bank liabilities, convert a bank's outstanding debt into equity, and
transfer some or all of a bank's assets to a public sector bridge bank or private sector
purchaser. Armed with these tools, the expectation is that regulators will trigger the
resolution process after the close of business on Friday, with the restructured bank then
able to open its doors for business as usual on Monday morning. Importantly, one of the
principal rationales underpinning the introduction of special resolution regimes has been
to ensure that banks can continue to perform their core payment functions during the
resolution process.115
The combination of emergency liquidity assistance facilities, deposit guarantee
schemes, and special resolution regimes enable banks to continue to perform their socially
useful storage, liquidity, and other functions in a way that the application of corporate
bankruptcy law would not generally permit. This extraordinary treatment-not generally
available to other commercial enterprises-is typically justified on the basis of the unique
vulnerability of bank balance sheets to destabilizing runs, the externalities associated with
111. The central bank can also simply credit new central bank reserves to the account(s) held by the relevant
bank(s) with the central bank.
112. The third party then steps into the shoes of the depositor in order to seek redress from the estate of the
bank.
113. In this very important respect, some deposit guarantee schemes are more effective than others. For a
comparison of the pre-crisis schemes in the United States and United Kingdom, for example, see ARMOUR ET
AL., supra note 5, at 316-19.
114. For a more detailed examination of the development and functions of special resolution regimes, see
generally John Armour, Making Bank Resolution Credible (ECGI, Working Paper No. 244/2014, 2014).
115. See, e.g., Council Directive 2014/59/, art. 5,2014 O.J. (L 173), 190, 190 (EU) (establishing a framework
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms) [hereinafter BRRD]; BANK OF ENG.,
THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S APPROACH TO RESOLUTION 7, (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter BANK OF ENGLAND'S
APPROACH], (describing frameworks to resolve failing banks, building societies, and some types of investment
firms).
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bank failure, and the risk that conventional bankruptcy proceedings may transmit or
magnify financial shocks.116 Importantly, it is also justified on the basis that these strategies
help ensure the smooth and efficient operation of bank-based payment systems during
periods of institutional or systemic distress.l 17 This leads inexorably to the question: what
happens when institutions provide core payment functions outside of the unique legal and
regulatory environment imposed on conventional deposit-taking banks? It is to this
important question that we now turn.
V. THE EMERGENCE AND RISKS OF THE SHADOW PAYMENT SYSTEM
Payment systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe
have undergone a series of significant institutional innovations over the course of the past
800 years. The pace of this innovation has accelerated in recent decades as a result of
technological advancements in data storage, analysis, and transmission. Amongst other
important developments-from ATMs, to chip and pin technology, to the hybrid RGTS
payment systems that facilitate billions of interbank payments-these technological
advancements have spurred the emergence and growth of a vibrant shadow payment
system.
The shadow payment system encompasses a diverse range of payment institutions.
These institutions share two core features. First, they perform the same basic payment
functions as conventional deposit-taking banks: providing customers with custodial and
transactional storage and liquidity. While some of these institutions also engage in credit,
liquidity, and maturity transformation similar to conventional deposit-taking banks-
thereby also making them part of the shadow banking system 18--this is ultimately
irrelevant to the question of whether they should also be considered part of the shadow
payment system. Simultaneously, of course, the extent to which the balance sheets of these
institutions exhibit credit, liquidity, or maturity mismatches will have a bearing on the risk
of institutional bankruptcy, and on the suitability of different strategies that might be
employed to ensure the continued performance of payment functions during periods of
institutional distress. Second, these institutions perform these functions outside the
perimeter of the regulated banking system. As a result, they do not directly benefit from
the emergency liquidity assistance facilities, deposit guarantee schemes, special resolution
regimes, or other prudential regulatory strategies designed to ensure that bank-based
payment systems can continue to function during periods of institutional or systemic stress,
unencumbered by the strict application of corporate bankruptcy law. This Part briefly
describes three of the most important and high-profile shadow payment systems: crypto-
currency exchanges, P2P payment systems, and mobile money platforms. It also identifies
and examines the key risks that arise from the bundling of storage and liquidity functions
outside the regulated banking system.
116. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 456-59.
117. See, e.g., BRRD, supra note 115 (establishing a framework for the recover and resolution of credit
institutions and investment firms); BANK OF ENGLAND'S APPROACH, supra note 115, at 7.
118. See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, 19 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y 1 (2013).
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A. Crypto-Currency Exchanges
One of the most noteworthy developments in global finance within the past decade has
been the emergence and proliferation of so-called crypto-currencies. Far and away the most
popular crypto-currency is Bitcoin, with a market capitalization of under $152 billion as of
May 1, 2018.119 The backbone of the Bitcoin payment system is an open source protocol
known as blockchain. Blockchain is a decentralized-or "distributed"-public ledger
shared amongst a P2P network comprised of all Bitcoin users. Whenever a Bitcoin is
transferred from one user to another, network participants verify settlement of the
transaction using sophisticated algorithms as part of a process known as Bitcoin mining.120
Once verified, the transaction is then permanently added to the distributed ledger, thus
creating a single historical record of all transactional activity.121 The growth potential of
Bitcoin itself as a means of making and receiving payments is somewhat limited due to its
relatively small and strictly controlled supply.122 Nevertheless, the broader growth
potential of crypto-currencies built around the blockchain protocol is enormous, as
arguably reflected by the fact that Bitcoin is now accepted by over 100,000 retailers,
including Expedia, Dell, Microsoft, PayPal, and Amazon.123
The emergence of Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies has spurred the development of
an entirely new species of financial intermediary: crypto-currency exchanges.124 Crypto-
currency exchanges facilitate the conversion of crypto-currencies into conventional fiat
currencies such as the U.S. dollar, pound sterling, and euro. The first generation of crypto-
currency exchanges performed this function in two operationally distinct stages.125 In the
first stage, the exchange performs essentially the same function as a conventional stock
exchange: matching buyers and sellers of Bitcoin and other currencies. In the second stage,
the prospective seller transfers the Bitcoin to the exchange for sale. The buyer is then
responsible for ensuring that it provides the exchange with sufficient funds, denominated
119. See COINMARKETCAP, http://www.coinmarketcap.com. (last visited May 1, 2018) By way of
comparison, the market capitalization of the second most popular c ypto-currency, Ethereum, is just under $65
billion. Id.
120. In exchange for verifying transactions, these "miners" are rewarded with newly created Bitcoins. See
generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-To-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM, BITCOLN (Nov. 8, 2008),
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
121. See Mohit Kaushal & Sheel Tyle, The Blockchain: What It Is and Why It Matters, BROOKINGS INST.
(Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/01/13/the-blockchain-what-it-is-and-why-it-
matters/.
122. The Blockchain protocol contemplates that the reward for verifying transactions will decrease over
time, reaching zero when the total number of outstanding Bitcoins reaches 21 million; see NAKAMOTO, supra
note 120.
123. See Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Now Accepted by 100,000 Merchants Worldwide, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-now-accepted-by-100000-merchants-worldwide-1486613. At
the same time, there is very little publicly available information regarding the volume of Bitcoin-denominated
payments processed by these retailers.
124. This is, in some respects, ironic given that one of the most frequently cited benefits of blockchain is
that it does not rely on (conventional) financial intermediaries. See, e.g., Kashual & Tyle, supra note 121.
125. While operationally distinct, these stages do not necessarily occur sequentially: i.e. the seller may
transfer the Bitcoin to the exchange before a buyer is identified. See Marcel Rosner & Andrew King,
Understanding and Regulating Twenty-First Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study, 114 MICH. L.
REv. 649 (2016) (discussing foreign payment systems that do not rely on a sequential mechanism).
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in the appropriate currency, to complete the purchase. Once both the Bitcoin and other
funds have been successfully transferred to the exchange, the trade is then cleared and
settled, with the Bitcoin transferred to the buyer and the corresponding funds to the seller.
In this important respect, the first generation of crypto-currency exchanges employed a
payment-versus-payment (PvP) system similar to the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS)
system through which a large proportion of the foreign exchange transactions in the world's
major currencies flow. 126
Until recently, the world's largest crypto-currency exchange was Mt. Gox. Founded
in Tokyo in 2009 as a platform for exchanging trading cards based on the game Magic:
The Gathering.127 Mt. Gox quickly evolved to become one of the cornerstones of the
nascent Bitcoin payment system.128 At its peak in 2013, it has been estimated that Mt. Gox
accounted for approximately 70% of global Bitcoin trading activity.129 In retrospect,
however, this success masked a number of significant institutional problems. In June 2013,
Mt. Gox was forced to temporarily suspend U.S. dollar conversion amidst widespread
rumors that the exchange was on the verge of bankruptcy.130 In November 2013, Wired
magazine reported that customers were experiencing delays of weeks, and in some cases
months, before they were able to withdraw their funds.131 Then, on February 28, 2014, Mt.
Gox filed for bankruptcy protection in Tokyo, reporting liabilities of approximately Y6.5
billion ($USD64 million) against assets of approximately Y3.84 billion ($USD38 million).
As part of the bankruptcy filing, the firm reported that about 750,000 Bitcoins belonging
to customers, along with another 100,000 belonging to Mt. Gox itself, were unaccounted
for and had likely been stolen.132 On the basis of Bitcoin's market price as of the date of
the bankruptcy filing, this translated into over $470 million in missing assets. 133
126. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, § 18.2.3 (providing further information regarding the mechanisms
of PvP settlement systems such as CLS).
127. See Paul Vigna, 5 Things About Mt Gox's Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/02/25/5-things-about-mt-goxs-crisis/ (detailing important facts about the Mt.
Gox crisis).
128. Id.
129. See Robert McMillan & Cade Metz, The Rise and Fall ofthe World's Largest Bitcoin Exchange, WIRED




132. See Robin Sidel et al., Almost Halfa Billion Worth ofBitcoins Vanish: Mt. Gox Says it Lost 750,000 of
Customers' Bilcoin to Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/Articles/mt-gox-to-hold-news-
conference-1393579356 (explaining the events up to the bankruptcy of Mt. Gox).
133. Id.
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Two subsequent events are noteworthy.134 First, on March 14, 2014, Mt. Gox filed for
Chapter 15 bankruptcy protection in the U.S.135 in order to invoke an automatic stay that
would prevent enforcement by aggrieved customers against assets situated in the United
States. 136 Second, on August 5, 2015, an action by a customer against he Japanese
bankruptcy trustee for the recovery of Bitcoin that remained within the control of the
exchange failed, the District Court finding that under the applicable Japanese law
customers could not remain owners of Bitcoin once it had been transferred to the
exchange.137 The end result appears to be that customers who held Bitcoin with Mt. Gox
will be treated as unsecured creditors whether or not the Bitcoin remains within the control
of the exchange, and will be barred from enforcing these unsecured claims by procedural
restrictions imposed by both United States and Japanese bankruptcy law. Understandably,
many customers have already sold their unsecured claims in the estate of Mt. Gox at a steep
discountl38 , and it remains unclear what percentage of their claims remaining customers
should ultimately expect to recover.
The bankruptcy of Mt. Gox vividly illustrates the risks that the shadow payment
system can pose to customers. These risks flow from two principal sources. The first is the
prospect of delayed transfer or conversion during the bankruptcy process (illiquidity). This
risk will be especially problematic where customers tore assets within a shadow payment
system with a view to eventually making payments for essential goods and services such
as food and shelter. This risk will also arise where customers rely heavily on these systems
to make or receive day-to-day payments, or where they maintain positive balances for
extended periods of time. The second risk is the potential write-down of customers' funds
arising from their treatment as unsecured liabilities in the context of any bankruptcy
proceeding (loss of value). Indeed, in many cases, unsecured claimants can expect to
recover little if anything following the conclusion of the bankruptcy process. These risks
134. A third event has been the subsequent (and meteoric) rise in the price of Bitcoin since the bankruptcy
filing. Crucially in this regard, one of the consequences of characterizing a customer claim as unsecured is that
the claim holder will not necessarily enjoy the full benefit of any increase in the value of Bitcoin that remains
with the exchange, with the value instead potentially fixed by reference to the Bitcoin-USD conversion rate as at
the commencement of proceedings; Nikhilesh De, Mt Gox Creditors Want Bitcoin Exchange Taken Out of
Bankruptcy, COINDESK (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/mt-gox-creditors-want-bitcoin-exchange-
taken-bankruptcy. A similar issue arose in relation to the conversion of foreign currency claims in the recent and
controversial decision of the English Supreme Court in Re Lehman Bros International (Europe) (in
administration) [2017] UKSC 38, [2017] 2 WLR 1497.
135. See Motion for Protective Order, In re Mt Gox Co., No. 14-31229-sgjl5, (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 10,
2014) (requesting provisional relief).
136. See Amended Complaint, Greene et al. v. Mt Gox Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01437 (2014 WL 1101996
N.D.111.).
137. See Tbky6 Chih6 Saibansho (Tokyo Dist. Ct.) Aug. 5, 2015, Hei 26 (wa) no. 33320,
2015WLJPCA0805800 1. The applicants in the case had relied on the right to segregation provided in Art. 62 of
the Japanese Bankruptcy Act. See also Kyodo, Bitcoins Lost in Mt. Gox Debacle 'Not Subject o Ownership'
Claims. Tokyo Court, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/06/national/crime-legal/bitcoins-lost-in-mt-gox-debacle-not-
subject-to-ownership-claims-tokyo-court-rules/#.WnzOH50pn2Q.
138. Bitcoin Builder, for example, offered to buy customers' Mt. Gox Bitcoin at 0.11 per Bitcoin in 2015.
See JP Buntinx, The Mt. Gox Post-Bankruptcy Claims: A Detailed Guide, BITCOINIsT (May 8, 2015),
http://bitcoinist.com/mtgox-post-bankruptcy-claims-detailed-guide/.
2018] 799
The Journal of Corporation Law
can then intersect-as they did in the case of Mt. Gox-insofar as the need for liquidity
compels customers to liquidate their claims at a significant discount to their nominal value.
B. P2P Payment Systems
While the failure of Mt. Gox provides us with useful insights into the potential risks
that the shadow payment system poses to customers, crypto-currency exchanges ultimately
exist on the fringes of the modem payment system. Somewhat closer to the center of this
system are a growing number of P2P payment systems. P2P payment systems utilize the
intemet to convey payment information and execute electronic fund transfers. In a typical
P2P transaction, the payor initiates a fund transfer by entering the payee's email address
and payment instructions via a secure website. The system then generates an email
informing the payee of the in-bound payment.
There are two different types of P2P payment systems, distinguished by the nature of
the accounts through which the funds are stored and transferred. In bank-based P2P
systems, the system facilitates the direct transfer of funds between demand deposit or other
accounts held by the payor and payee with conventional banks.139 Thus, for example, when
you use Apple Pay to buy a triple shot, no foam, soy latte at Starbucks, the technology
embedded in your iPhone uses near field communication technology to send encrypted
payment information to the store's card reader. The funds are then transferred directly from
your bank account to Starbucks, without ever passing though Apple's hands. Bank-based
P2P systems thus do not perform any custodial or transactional storage function.
Accordingly, these systems are perhaps best understood as technology platforms that
merely facilitate retail interbank transfers.
Proprietary account P2P systems, in contrast, facilitate the transfer of funds via book
transfers between customer accounts held and administered by the shadow payment system
itself.140 These accounts can be funded using a debit or credit card, or from the proceeds
of previous in-bound fund transfers. Importantly, payees can either choose to transfer paid-
in funds to a conventional bank account or, alternatively, store the funds in the system's
proprietary accounts for the purpose of making future payments. Unlike bank-based P2P
systems, proprietary account P2P systems are thus designed to provide customers with
transactional and custodial storage and liquidity. These systems thus fall within the
perimeter of the shadow payment system.
P2P payment systems offer a number of potential advantages relative to other forms
of electronic fund transfer. These advantages are best understood in the context of online
auction sites such as eBay.141 Many sellers on eBay are private individuals looking to sell
a particular article-e.g. an old sofa, unloved musical instrument, or Star WarsTM
collectibles-but who are not otherwise engaged in the business of manufacturing or
selling these articles. For these individuals, the costs of merchant banking services enabling
them to accept credit card payments, for example, are often prohibitively high. Moreover,
139. Kenneth Kuttner & James McAndrews, Personal On-Line Payments, 7 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON.
POL'Y REv. 35, 37 (2001).
140. Payors, and in most cases, payees are thus required to open an account with the system as a precondition
to its use. Id.
141. See id at 35; Ronald Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEx. L. REv. 681, 681-82
(2003).
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given the anonymity of online auctions, buyers are understandably hesitant to provide
sensitive financial information to sellers. Accordingly, as Ronald Mann explains:
"purchasers in the early days of eBay had to use cashier's checks or money orders.
Typically, sellers waited to ship products until they received the paper-based payment
device in the mail."1 42 The development of P2P payment systems olved both of these
problems: offering a fast, easy, affordable, and secure way of making payments between
anonymous buyers and sellers.
There are currently a number of different P2P payment systems, including Apple Pay,
Google Wallet, Venmo, Dwolla, and AliPay by Alibaba. By far the most ubiquitous P2P
payment system, however, is PayPal.143 PayPal was acquired by eBay in 2002 as a
replacement for its own, far less popular, P2P payment system.144 In July 2015, eBay then
spun off PayPal into an independent publicly-listed company.145 As of September 30,
2016, PayPal had approximately 192 million active accounts supporting payments in over
100 currencies.146 The total volume of payments processed through PayPal in 2015 was
approximately $USD282 billion-roughly $USD8,942 every second.14 7
PayPal is a proprietary account P2P payment system. Purchasers are able to fund their
accounts using debit or credit cards, electronic fund transfers from their bank, or with any
positive balance they maintain in their PayPal account. Interestingly, recent data suggests
that many customers maintain positive balances in their PayPal account, thus using the
system as a mechanism for custodial storage. According to a recently filed Form 8-K,
PayPal's funds receivable and customer accounts totaled over $18 billion.148 Even more
interesting is PayPal's stated policy regarding these balances. As explained in PayPal's
U.S. terms and conditions: "Any PayPal balance you hold represents an unsecured claim
against PayPal ... and is not insured by the ... FDIC . .. PayPal will not voluntarily make
these balances available to its creditors in the event of bankruptcy."l49 The corresponding
language in PayPal UK's user agreement reads: "If you hold a Balance you will not receive
interest or any other earnings on the Balance because European law forbids paying interest
on e-Money, as it is a cash-equivalent and not a deposit."150 The U.K. user agreement goes
on to define e-Money as: "monetary value, as represented as a claim on PayPal, which is
142. Id. at 683-84.
143. While AliPay technically has more active accounts (approximately 400 million as of December 2016),
the vast majority of these accounts are held by customers in China.
144. See Nick Wingfield & Jathon Sapsford, eBay Plans to Buy PayPal In $1.4 Billion Stock Deal, WALL
ST. J. (July 9, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/Articles/SB 102613018741609120.
145. See Press Release, PayPal, PayPal Celebrates Listing on Nasdaq and Completes Separation from eBay
Inc., (July 20, 2015), https://www.paypal.com/stories/us/paypal-celebrates-listing-on-nasdaq-and-completes-
separation-from-ebay-inc.
146. PayPal Holdings, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 40 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://investor.paypal-
corp.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=1 633917-16-243&CIK=l 633917.
147. PayPal Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://investor.paypal-
corp.com/secfiling.cfim?filinglD=1 633917-16-11 3&CIK=1 633917.
148. PayPal Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 31, 2018), https://investor.paypal-
corp.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD= 1633917-18-18&CIK=1 633917.
149. User Agreement, PAYPAL, https://wwv.pavpal.com/ius/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full (last
visited, Apr. 14, 2018)
150. UK User Agreement for PayPal Service, PAYPAL § 2.1 (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full.
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stored on an electronic device, issued on receipt of funds, and accepted as a means of
payment by persons other than PayPal."1 51
PayPal's customer documentation in both the United States and United Kingdom
makes it reasonably clear that customer balances will be treated as unsecured liabilities in
the event of PayPal's bankruptcy. As a result, customer funds held within PayPal's
proprietary accounts are vulnerable to delayed transfer and conversion, along with potential
loss of value, in the context of any bankruptcy process. Viewed from this perspective, the
risks to PayPal customers are broadly similar to those that ultimately materialized in the
case of Mt. Gox. 152
C. Mobile Money Platforms
If P2P systems such as PayPal represent the current state of the shadow payment
system in places like the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, mobile money
platforms represent one of its many potential futures-especially in emerging markets. The
term "mobile money" is used to describe a number of different institutional platforms
through which mobile phone companies offer custodial and transactional storage and
liquidity. Mobile money platforms enable customers to deposit and withdraw funds
through a network of local agents, including post offices, comer stores, petrol stations, and
other retail establishments.153 These platforms then enable customers to use their mobile
phones to transfer deposited funds-so-called "e-money "-via SMS text messages to their
friends, family, merchants, and public authorities. Initially, many mobile money platforms
were limited to facilitating payments between customers of the same mobile network.
Increasingly, however, mobile providers have coordinated in the development of
interoperable platforms facilitating payments between customers of different networks. 154
One of the first-and arguably most successful-mobile money platforms, M-Pesa,
was launched by Safaricom in Kenya in 2007. By the beginning of 2016, there were more
than 270 mobile money platforms, operating in 93 countries, with approximately 134
million active accounts.155 In terms of geographic dispersion, by far the largest number of
151. Id. at § 16.
152. Of course, should PayPal ultimately meet a similar fate, its broader customer base and considerably
higher transaction volume could potentially mean that its failure had a far more significant and widespread market
impact. However, this is by no means a certainty. If, for example, the current $13 billion is widely dispersed
amongst its retail customers, then it may very well be the case that the bankruptcy of PayPal would have little or
no impact on either customer wealth or the operation of the wider (shadow) payment system.
153. As of December 2015, Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA), a leading industry association,
estimated that mobile money platforms collectively encompassed approximately 3.2 million of these local agents;
see GSMA, 2015 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY: MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNBANKED 22 (2016),
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/SOTIR 2015.pdf.
154. See GSMA, 2014 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY: MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNBANKED 5, 16
(2015) https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf Notably,
this development echoes the establishment of the London Clearing House and other clearinghouses in the context
of bank-based payment systems. See supra Part III.A; "transfer" of funds in an interoperable network of this kind
appears to take effect by the customer instructing the provider to debit the customer's account (or "wallet") and
to take steps to credit (or enable another system provider to credit) a transferee with a claim of equivalent value
(less any fees incurred), such that in legal terms there is not strictly a "transfer" but rather the extinction of one
claim and the creation of one or more new ones; see Proctor supra note 8, at 189.
155. The Mobile Economy: Africa 2016, GROUPE SPECIALE MOBILE Ass'N,
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mobile money platforms are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Latin America and South
and East Asia also contributing significantly to global growth in terms of the number of
new platforms.156 Given the large unbanked populations in many countries in these
regions, mobile money is often presented as a promising means of promoting greater
financial inclusion.157
The commercial viability of mobile money platforms such as M-Pesa turns on their
ability to attract a critical mass of customers within a relatively short span of time. Mobile
money platforms are thus subject to pronounced network effects, with the attractiveness
of a platform to potential customers depending on the number of existing customers within
the network. The viability of these platforms is also a function of the speed and cost of
depositing and withdrawing cash-i.e. exchanging cash for e-money and vice versa-and
transferring e-money to third parties.159 The use of mobile phone technology makes
transferring e-money relatively straightforward. It also helps ensure that the technology
itself is widely disseminated amongst prospective customers. In the case of M-Pesa,
Safaricom was then able to establish and entrench its platform by recruiting a large number
of local agents, thus ensuring that customers were able to deposit and withdraw cash in a
wide variety of locations across Kenya. These agents transact with M-Pesa customers on
their own account, using a float of cash and e-money held in their own name to fund
transactions.160 When the cash or e-money component of an agent's float is exhausted, the
agent must seek to replenish its float by exchanging cash or e-money with another
(typically larger) agent.161 At the top of this chain are then a small number of large
wholesale agents with whom Safaricoml62 transacts directly for the issue of new e-money
or the conversion of existing e-money into cash or other funds.163
The reliance of mobile money platforms on networks of local agents, wholesale agents,
and ultimately mobile phone companies to provide both storage and liquidity raises what
https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=3bc2 1 ea879a5b217b64d62fa24c55bdf&download
[hereinafter The Mobile Economy].
156. Id. at 13.
157. Indeed, the objective of promoting financial inclusion permeates the GSMA annual state of the industry
reports; see id.
158. See David S. Evans & Alexis Pirchio, An Empirical Examination of Why Mobile Money Schemes Ignite
in Some Developing Countries But Flounder in Most 5 (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Econ.,
Paper No. 723, 2015); Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Durlauf& Blume eds., 2008).
159. Evans & Pirchio, supra note 158. See also Janine Aron, Leapfrogging: A Survey of the Nature and
Economic Implications ofMobile Money 9.1 (CSAE Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2017-02, 2017).
160. As Colin Mayer and Michael Klein have emphasized, this means that agents do not perform the same
function that a bank branch performs when it accepts deposits and offers withdrawals to its customers, for in
doing so the branch acts on behalf of the bank. Michael Klein & Colin Mayer, Mobile Banking and Financial
Inclusion: The Regulatory Lessons 7-8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5664, 2011).
161. Frederik Eijkman et al., Bridges to Cash: the Retail End ofM-PESA, 34 SAVINGS& DEV. 219 (2010).
162. Or, more precisely, a trustee corporation in respect of which Safaricom acts as agent. See infra Part VI.
163. Eijkman et al., supra note 161, at 224. Other than transactions between Safaricom and these highest
level wholesale agents, transactions in this system do not appear to involve Safaricom directly, and
(correspondingly) do not appear to involve the issue of new e-money or the redemption of existing e-money. Id
Instead, system participants simply transfer e-money to each other in what appears to be an assignment of the
contractual rights against Safaricom that a holder of e-money enjoys in exchange for cash. Id.
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should by now be a familiar question: how can these firms credibly commit to perform
these functions during periods of institutional stress? As with crypto-currency exchanges
and P2P payment systems, the provision of these functions outside the regulated banking
system poses two principal risks. The first risk is that customers will experience delays in
converting their e-money into cash during any bankruptcy process. To put this risk into
perspective, the World Bank's 2017 Doing Business survey estimates that the average
length of a corporate bankruptcy process in Sub-Saharan Africa-measured by reference
to the time between default and the distribution to a senior secured creditor in full or partial
satisfaction of their claim -64 is approximately 2.9 years.165 The second risk is that the
entitlement to the conversion of e-money into cash or other funds will be characterized as
an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy process, such that any customer funds received and
retained by the debtor in exchange for the issuance of e-money are available for distribution
to the firm's general body of creditors-with whom customers would then be forced to
compete.166 In this respect, it is worth observing that the World Bank has estimated that
the mean recovery rate in Sub-Saharan Africa for secured creditors is approximately 20.3
cents on the dollar.167 On average, in other words, unsecured creditors of bankrupt firms
in Sub-Saharan Africa receive nothing at the conclusion of the bankruptcy process.168
The most immediate risks stemming from the emergence of the shadow payment
system are those that this system poses to customers. Looking forward, however, the
continued growth of the shadow payment system may also pose potentially significant risks
to economic and financial stability. These risks flow from three principal sources. The first
stems from the prospect that large numbers of micro and small enterprises will come to
rely on the shadow payment system as a conduit for working capital purposes, i.e. as an
"account" into which the day-to-day receipts of the business flow and out of which
164. See Resolving Insolvency Methodology, THE WORLD BANK: DOING BUSINESS,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/resolving-insolvency#time (last visited Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter
WORLD BANK, Resolving Insolvency]. The survey presents a hypothetical case involving an insolvent and illiquid
incorporated debtor with a medium sized (hotel) business and one secured (bank) creditor, and invites participants
to, inter alia, estimate the time from default to payment of some or all of the bank debt, assuming the
commencement of bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings. Id.
165. Id.. Of course, where a customer enjoys an absolute proprietary interest, they may be able to access
assets before secured creditors are able to enforce against them. This could include, for example, the circumstance
where a customer enjoys a beneficial interest under a trust. See infra Part VI. Inevitably, however, there will be
some delay while a customer's interest is verified. If there is any dispute as to the scope or validity of this interest,
these delays may be significant. See ROBERT HANTUSCH, TRUST CLAIMS AND CLIENT MONIES: LEFT HIGH AND
DRY OR SCOOPING THE POOL? 4 (2010), http://clients.squareeye.net/uploads/3sb/events/211010_hantusch.pdf.
Reflecting on the Farepak litigation in the English courts, Hantusch observes: "It is instructive to note the
extremely limited benefit that was received from even the successful trust claims in the Farepak case. In late
2009, 3 years after the onset of insolvency and only after considerable costs had been incurred ... [a distribution
was made] in settlement of trust claims." Id.
166. The holders of e-money would typically hold a bundle of contractual rights against the system provider,
including the right to call for the convertibility of their e-money. In the event of breach by the system provider,
these rights would entitle the customer to sue for damages or, depending on the nature of the relevant conversion
rights, in debt. In either case, the customer would be ranked as an unsecured creditor and thus liable to compete
(typically on a pro rata basis) with other such creditors.
167. WORLD BANK, Resolving Insolvency, supra note 164.
168. Unsecured creditors may enjoy some preferential status vis-A-vis secured creditors. Id.
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payments are made to creditors, suppliers, and employees.169 The jurisdictions in which
this is most likely to occur include many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia,
and elsewhere, where the conventional banking systems have traditionally underserved the
small business community. 170
In the event that businesses were to use the shadow payment system in this way, there
is a risk that the bankruptcy of one or more payment institutions would result in customer
assets being trapped for the duration of the bankruptcy process-thereby starving these
businesses of the working capital needed to pay creditors, suppliers, and employees. In
addition to jeopardizing the solvency of these businesses, the knock-on effects stemming
from the delayed repayment of creditors and suppliers could also jeopardize the solvency
of a broader cross-section of firms within the real economy. Through this channel,
institutional instability within the shadow payment system could generate significant
negative externalities, ultimately leading to a contraction in economic activity and
employment.
The second risk stems from the prospect that, as the shadow payment system continues
to grow and evolve, the pressure to generate profits may drive institutions to bundle
payment functions with more conventional forms of financial intermediation: combining
their promise of transactional and custodial storage and liquidity to customers with
investments in longer term and potentially illiquid assets. These pressures can already be
observed in connection with the evolution of mobile money platforms, where governments
and industry lobby groups have invested considerable time and effort in identifying ways
to make platforms commercially sustainable.171 PayPal, meanwhile, now offers a range of
credit products to its customers.172 It also invests customer funds in "highly liquid, highly
rated instruments" not protected by deposit guarantee schemes.173 As these and othef
169. While medium-sized and larger enterprises could also theoretically be exposed to this risk, they are also
likely to have more reliable access to both the conventional bank-based payment system and sources of credit
enabling them to withstand any liquidity shock.
170. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOR SMALL BUSINESSES AND Low INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2014),
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/CFSO70114RFL.pdf (describing the gap between the
supply of and demand for financial services amongst small businesses in India).
171. The pressures to make these platforms profitable is particularly evident in the outputs of the GSMA.
For an overview of its policy work and resources in relation to the commercial aspects of mobile money, see
Mobile Money Program, GSMA, https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordeveloiment/proramme/mobile-mone/,
(last visited Feb. 8, 2018). A representative example is the GSMA's analysis regarding the commercial
sustainability ofso-called "payments banks" in India: "To become profitable, payments banks will need to drive
digital transactions through accounts at scale. However, unlike traditional mobile money players, it is unlikely
that payments bank will be able to live off transaction revenues alone-and without a growing ecosystem and
adjacent revenue streams (e.g., digital credit, micro insurance and merchant payments), the road to profitability
will be difficult." GSMA, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR PAYMENTS BANKS IN INDIA 6 (2016),
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GSMAThe-business-case-for-
payments-banks-in-India_2016-1.pdf
172. For an overview of PayPal's consumer credit products, see PAYPAL,
https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/paypal-credit (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
173. See PayPal Holdings, Inc., General Form for Registration of Securities (Form 10) F-14 (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://investor.paypal-corp.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=l 193125-15-62742&CIK=1633917. For media
commentary on this point, see Izabella Kaminska, Is it a Bank, a Money Transmitter, or a Silicon Valley Shadow
Financer? No, It's Just PayPal!, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE (Aug. 6, 2015),
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institutions continue to expand into more conventional forms of financial intermediation,
the resulting credit, maturity, and liquidity mismatches will introduce the risk of
destabilizing runs by customers and other short-term creditors.
It is at this point that the stark differences in the legal and regulatory treatment of
institutions within the conventional banking and shadow payment systems may become
particularly salient. As we have seen, while the shadow payment system may appear to be
an effective substitute for conventional bank-based payment systems, the unique prudential
regulatory regimes to which banks are subject enhances the credibility of their commitment
to perform their core storage and liquidity functions during periods of institutional or
systemic stress. In effect, these regulatory regimes enhance the moneyness of a bank's
deposits and other short-term liabilities relative to the otherwise functionally equivalent
liabilities issued by institutions within the shadow payment system.174 During periods of
market turmoil or uncertainty, therefore, we might expect to observe pronounced outflows
of customer funds from the shadow payment system and into conventional deposit-taking
banks.175 In jurisdictions where large numbers of customers do not have access to banks,
meanwhile, we would likewise expect to observe spikes in the demand for the conversion
of customer funds held within the shadow payment system into cold hard cash. Through
this latter channel, correlated runs within the shadow payment system could conceivably
lead to a broader contraction in the money supply, thereby driving a contraction in
investment and economic growth.176
Finally, as an increasing proportion of customer funds become held by institutions
outside the conventional banking system, there is a risk that this may undercut the ability
of central banks to effectively manage the money supply. Two of the most important policy
tools that central banks currently use to manage the money supply are reserve ratios and
the discount rate.177 Reserve ratios impose a minimum fraction of deposits that banks must
hold in the form of cash or non-interest bearing central bank reserves-thus effectively
limiting the proportion of a bank's short-term funding that it can use to make loans and
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/06/2136828/is-it-a-bank-a-money-transmitter-or-a-silicon-valley-shadow-
financier-no-its-just-paypal/?se=body&so=cu; David Bergendahl, Your PayPal Balance Isn 't FDIC Insured: The
Case for a New Model of Financial Startups, MEDIUM (Sept. 21, 2014), https://medium.com/@dbrgndl/paypal-
isnt-fdic-insured-non-banks-being-bankish-and-a-new-model-for-financial-startups-df6dl6c2d4b.
174. See Part IV, discussing the vulnerability of banks to destabilizing runs by depositors and other short-
term creditors.
175. Id.
176. For the canonical description of how the correlated failure of banks can precipitate a contraction in the
money supply, see FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, MONETARY HISTORY, supra note 20. For a modem formulation of
this problem incorporating the shadow banking system, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016). Of course, the risk that the correlated failure of institutions within the shadow
payment system would precipitate a material contraction in the money supply would ultimately hinge on the
extent of the credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation taking place within these institutions and the overall
share of financial intermediation being performed within the shadow payment system.
177. The third core policy tool consists of open market operations whereby central banks purchase and sell
government and other debt securities on the open market in order to influence supply and demand dynamics
within private debt markets and, ultimately, prevailing interest rates. For an overview of how the Federal Reserve
uses these and other tools, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 20-53 (10th ed. 2016.),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pfcomplete.pdf.
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other longer term investments.178 Discount rates, meanwhile, represent the interest rates
that central banks charge in connection with short-term loans to member banks. By
raising-or lowering-the reserve ratio and discount rate, central banks can thus increase
or decrease the supply of money and credit, thereby increasing-or decreasing-the cost
of capital and stimulating-or dampening-the levels of investment and spending in the
real economy. Viewed from this perspective, banks can be understood as the primary
transmission mechanisms through which central banks seek to promote price stability,
financial stability, and other policy objectives. In a world where the shadow payment
system grew to rival or supplant the conventional banking system, we would thus expect
this to undermine the ability of central banks to use existing monetary policy tools in
pursuit of these important objectives.
At present, each of these potential systemic risks is somewhat speculative. The shadow
payment system has simply not achieved the scale necessary to pose a clear and present
danger to financial or economic stability. In Kenya, where mobile money has become an
important part of the financial ecosystem, the total stock of e-money is still likely only a
small fraction of the aggregate money supply.179 The $13USD billion sitting in PayPal's
customer accounts is similarly only equivalent to approximately one tenth of one per cent
of FDIC insured bank deposits.180 Moreover, few if any shadow payment systems appear
to currently engage in meaningful levels of credit, maturity, or liquidity transformation.
Simultaneously, however, there was a time in the development of all important economic
institutions when they were a relatively small, unimportant, and misunderstood curiosity.
Perhaps more importantly, while these systemic risks may not presently appear that
significant, identifying them at this early stage can enhance our understanding of how best
to approach the design and regulation of this increasingly important component of the
financial system.
Together, the case studies of Mt. Gox, PayPal, and M-Pesa provide us with important
insights into the potential risks stemming from the simultaneous provision of storage and
liquidity outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system. From the perspective of
customers, these risks flow principally from the prospect of delayed repayment, along with
the potential write-down of customer funds arising from their treatment as unsecured
178. More recently, these reserve ratios have been supplemented by liquidity coverage ratios designed to
ensure that banks hold a sufficient stock of high quality liquid assets to be able to meet expected outflows in the
event of a hypothetical 30-day stress scenario. See generally BCBS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III:
THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQuIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (2013),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf (describing the LCR).
179. Because payments are typically measured and reported inflows, whereas the money supply is inherently
a stock measure, it is difficult to determine how big the e-money float is relative to the broader money supply.
However, with Kenya's current M2 money supply-which includes notes and coins, central bank reserves, and
bank deposits-at over 2.3 trillion KES (or 53,000 KES for every man, woman and child in the country), it seems
highly unlikely that e-money is equivalent to anything more than a small fraction of the money supply. For official
figures of the money supply in Kenya, see Monetary and Finance Statistics, CENT. BANK OF KENYA
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/statistics/monetary-finance-statistics/ (last visited April 15, 2018). The Kenyan
government also has an ownership stake in Safaricom, the operator f M-Pesa.
180. On the basis that the total value of U.S. dollar deposits insured by the FDIC was approximately 11.3
trillion U.S. dollars at the end of 2015. See Value ofDeposits ofFDIC-Insured Commercial Banks in the United
States from 2000 to 2016 (In Trillion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193621/fdic-
insured-commercial-bank-liabilities-through-deposits/ ( howing value of FDIC deposits) (subscription required).
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claims in the context of any bankruptcy proceeding. From a macroeconomic perspective,
these risks flow from the potential knock-on effects stemming from the failure of one or
more institutions within the shadow payment system, the prospect of destabilizing runs,
and constraints on the ability of central banks to effectively manage the money supply. In
the next Part, we identify and examine the likely effectiveness of four strategies that have
been-or might in future be-employed to address these risks. We also examine a fifth
strategy-structural separation-that may ultimately provide a more effective means of
addressing these risks without undercutting the perceived benefits of these systems and
thus their potential desirability as substitutes for conventional bank-based payment
systems.
VI. REGULATING THE SHADOW PAYMENT SYSTEM
Having identified the risks stemming from the emergence and growth of the shadow
payment system, we now turn our attention to the range of strategies that might be used to
address these risks. This section examines four strategies drawn from those currently
employed within various components of the shadow payment system: portfolio restrictions,
private third party insurance, outsourcing the storage function to deposit-taking banks, and
trusts. While these strategies are not without their prospective benefits, they each focus
primarily on ensuring the secure storage of customer funds while neglecting to fully
account for the impact of the application of corporate bankruptcy law on the credibility of
the commitment to provide customers with liquidity. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the
current size of the shadow payment system, these strategies also do very little, if anything,
to address potential systemic risks. For these reasons, we go on to examine a fifth
strategy-the structural separation of payment functions-as a potentially more desirable
strategy for ensuring effective storage and liquidity during periods of institutional and
systemic stress.
Rather than engaging in an in-depth evaluation of the relevant business models and
regulatory regimes in specific jurisdictions, our examination proceeds on the basis of first
principles-distilling these strategies down to their fundamental features. We adopt this
approach for several reasons. First, the shadow payment system represents a new frontier
in institutional design and regulation. While several jurisdictions have proposed or adopted
regulatory regimes targeting institutions within the shadow payment system, most of these
regimes either attempt to shoehom institutions into conventional banking regulation or give
them extremely wide latitude to design institutional features to protect customers and
minimize potential systemic risks. An example of the former approach is the U.S. Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency's proposed fintech charter,181 while an example of the
latter is the European Union's Payment Services Directive (PSD2).182 Ultimately, the
emergence of new institutions, posing new policy challenges, demands new and creative
thinking. Second, as described in Part V, there is enormous diversity in the business models
181. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH (Dec. 2016), http://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-
purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf (discussing the OCC's proposed fintech charter). This proposal
specifically seeks to incorporate fintech businesses involved in the payments industry.
182. European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2366, art. 10(1)(a), 2015 O.J. (L 337/35) (EU). The
other two strategies-third party insurance and piggy banking-are discussed in greater detail below.
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of the institutions that comprise the shadow payment system. The same is true of the
regulatory regimes to which they are currently subject. This diversity demands that our
descriptions of the available strategies remain necessarily somewhat abstract. Third, each
of the strategies examined in this section could theoretically be implemented by means of
private contracting, industry self-regulation, public regulatory intervention, or some
combination of the three.183 We are agnostic about which is likely to be most effective in
practice and, intuitively, would expect the answer to depend heavily on the specific
business models, along with e prevailing legal, political, and institutional environment.
Finally, as stated at the outset, our primary objective in identifying these strategies is not
to determine which is most socially desirable-either relative to each other or in relation
to the regulatory strategies governing conventional bank-based payment systems. Instead,
our principal objective at this stage is simply to evaluate whether these strategies are likely
to effectively address the risks stemming from the bundling of storage and liquidity
functions outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system and, where necessary, to
identify potential tradeoffs.
A. Do Nothing
Any thorough examination of the universe of available policy alternatives must:
necessarily begin with an evaluation of the consequences of doing nothing.184 In this
context, "doing nothing" essentially involves the decision not to adopt any measures
designed to enhance the credibility of a shadow payment system's commitment to continue
to perform its core storage and liquidity functions in the event of bankruptcy, thereby
passing the risk of illiquidity and loss of value on to its customers and generating potential
systemic risks. This strategy is considerably more than a stalking horse for other more
realistic or attractive alternatives. It was the strategy implicitly adopted by Mt. Gox. It is
also the strategy more consciously and-to its credit-transparently adopted by PayPal in
the U.S. and U.K.. From the perspective of the shadow payment system and its customers,
the short-term benefits of this strategy stem from the potential cost savings relative to the
other more interventionist strategies described below, along with the possibility of using
customer funds as an additional source of investment capital and revenue. Inevitably,
however, these benefits must be weighed against both the direct costs to customers in the
event of an institution's bankruptcy, along with the potential externalities stemming from
the inability of customers to pay creditors, suppliers, and employees. Where doing nothing
foments potential systemic risks, the resulting costs to society would obviously also need
to be taken into consideration.
183. For a discussion of network governance models, see Bruce J. Summers & Kristin E. Wells, Governance
of Payment Systems: A Theoretical Framework and Cross-Country Comparison, 3 J. FIN. MKT.
INFRASTRUCTURES 1, 1 (2014).
184. This follows from the Coasian observation that the costs of intervention may ultimately outweigh the
resulting benefits. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/724810.pdf~refreqid=excelsior:cl8fd650c5c7a35eeddde907edb7bl73
(discussing "actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others").
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B. Portfolio Restrictions
One frequently identified strategy for protecting shadow payment system customers is
the imposition of portfolio restrictions. Portfolio restrictions impose limits on the types of
assets in which shadow payment systems can invest customer funds, typically restricting
them to cash and low risk, highly liquid securities. For example, mobile money platforms
in many jurisdictions are required to maintain a 1:1 ratio of deposit liabilities to liquid
assets available to fund customer conversion demands.18 5 These requirements are then
often combined with a prohibition against comingling customer funds with the firm's other
assets.186 In Europe, the PSD2 similarly identifies investments in "secure, liquid low-risk
assets" as one of three possible mechanisms by which regulated "payment institutions" are
permitted to safeguard customer funds.187
Portfolio restrictions are designed to ensure that shadow payment systems maintain a
sufficient stock of highly liquid assets that can be used to fund customer conversion
demands, thereby ensuring that these demands do not themselves trigger firm-level
liquidity problems-i.e. runs. In this respect, portfolio restrictions can be viewed as
reducing the marginal probability of institutional distress and bankruptcy. On their own,
however, these restrictions do little to ameliorate the negative repercussions for customers
in the event that other aspects of a firm's business-its mobile phone operations, for
example-drive it into bankruptcy. Absent other complimentary strategies, these assets
will still form part of the bankrupt firm's estate. As a result, customers will still be
vulnerable to the risks of illiquidity and loss of value stemming from the bankruptcy
process. Importantly, by limiting the range of assets in which institutions are permitted to
invest, portfolio restrictions also constrain the ability of these institutions to use customer
funds as a foundation for engaging in other socially useful forms of financial
intermediation.
C. Private Third Party Insurance
Another frequently identified strategy for protecting customers is the provision of
insurance by an independent third party. The New York State Department of Financial
Services Virtual Currency Regulation, for example, identifies a surety bond as one of the
mechanisms that licensed crypto-currency exchanges can utilize to protect customer
funds. 1s The PSD2 similarly envisions that payment institutions may protect customer
funds by way of an insurance policy or guarantee from a non-affiliated bank or insurance
company, payable to customers in the event that the institution is unable to meet its
financial obligations.189 In the U.K., customers would also potentially receive (however
inadvertently) protection under section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, which renders
credit card companies joint and severally liable in the event that a supplier is unable to
185. See, e.g., The National Payment System Act, No. 39 (2011) Cap. 493E § 25 (Kenya).
186. Id. As described in greater detail below, this prohibition often results in the use of piggy banking
strategies.
187. The other two strategies-third party insurance and piggy banking-are discussed in greater detail
below.
188. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGs. tit. 23, ch. §200.9(a). As a substitute, a licensed exchange can also
maintain a trust account with a third party custodian (see discussion regarding trust accounts below).
189. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 10(1)(b).
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honor its contractual commitments.190 Thus, PayPal customers who funded their accounts
using their credit card and were subsequently prevented from converting or transferring
those funds could conceivably seek redress from their credit card company-in effect
rendering the credit card company a third party guarantor of PayPal's contractual
obligations.19 1 Ultimately, the rationale for the provision of third party insurance in this
context is to ensure that there is a party contractually obligated to provide customers with
liquidity in the event that the shadow payment system itself is unable to do so by virtue of,
for example, the strict application of corporate bankruptcy law. In this respect, this trategy
can be understood as a form of private deposit guarantee scheme.
In theory, private third party insurance can help insulate customers from the illiquidity
and loss of value stemming from a shadow payment system's bankruptcy. Intuitively,
however, the effectiveness of this insurance is likely to depend on the probability of
correlated default by the shadow payment system and private insurer. This joint probability
of default is likely to be a function of at least two variables. The first is the size of the
shadow payment system (as measured by the quantum of insured customer funds) relative
to that of the insurer. The larger the system, the more likely that its bankruptcy will place
demands on the insurer that might threaten its own liquidity and, ultimately, solvency. The
second is the interconnectedness of the shadow payment system with the broader financial
system. The higher the level of interconnectedness, the higher the probability that the
shadow payment system and insurer will simultaneously come under pressure in the
context of a more systemic liquidity crisis. Accordingly, as the size and interconnectedness
of shadow payment systems increases, we would expect a corresponding decrease in the
credibility of the private insurer's commitment to provide the necessary liquidity insurance.
This, in turn, highlights the comparative advantage of sovereign states-given their large
balance sheets, the absence of binding solvency or liquidity constraints, and the legal
authority to print money-as credible providers of emergency liquidity assistance during
periods of broader financial instability. It also highlights the potential Achilles' heel of this
strategy: the bigger the shadow payment system becomes, the less effective we would
expect third party insurance to be as a mechanism for protecting consumers or insuring
against the materialization of potential systemic risks.
D. Piggy Banking
The term "piggy banking " refers to a third range of strategies pursuant to which
shadow payment systems outsource the custodial storage function to conventional deposit-
taking banks, thereby piggy backing off the prudential regulatory strategies described in
Part IV. There are at least two types of piggy banking strategies. The first-
intermediated-strategy involves the storage of customer funds in an omnibus bank
account held in the name of the shadow payment system. This first strategy is expressly
envisaged by the PSD2 as one of the mechanisms by which payment institutions can protect
190. See Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39 § 75 (Eng.). Section 75 places a number of conditions on the right
to seek redress. To our knowledge, section 75 has not been employed to seek redress against a supplier that would
fall under the definition of a shadow payment system.
191. Although in this example it seems doubtful that customers would be using PayPal for the purposes of
custodial storage.
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customer funds.192 It also appears to be the strategy employed by several mobile money
platforms.193 The second-direct holding-strategy involves the storage of customer funds
in bank accounts held directly in the name of customers. This second strategy, which is the
essence of bank-based P2P payment systems, effectively moves customer funds out of the
shadow payment system and into the conventional banking system.
The potential benefits of piggy banking flow from the prudential regulatory regimes
governing deposit-taking banks. As we have seen, these regimes include deposit guarantee
schemes designed to protect depositor funds and provide them with liquidity during periods
of institutional stress, along with emergency liquidity assistance facilities and special
resolution regimes designed to prevent or contain potential systemic risks. For these
reasons, direct holding strategies pose relatively few risks to customers beyond the narrow
case where a shadow payment system is in the zone of, or enters into, bankruptcy during
any period of time after funds have entered the payment system but before they have been
safely deposited in the customer's bank account.194
However, where customer funds are comingled in a bank account held in the name of
the shadow payment system itself, customers may still be exposed to a number of
potentially significant risks. First, insofar as the customer's contract is with the shadow
payment system and not the bank, customers may find it difficult to secure timely access
to their funds in the event of the shadow payment system's bankruptcy. This may be
particularly problematic where the bank has taken security over the funds in these accounts.
Second, in the event that the bank was to fail, it is not necessarily clear that the shadow
payment system or its customers would be adequately protected. Many deposit guarantee
schemes, for example, are capped at relatively low levels and may not apply to commercial
deposits. In recognition of this risk, Kenya, for example, recently proposed an amendment
to its deposit insurance scheme that would provide pass-through protection to mobile
money customers.195
More broadly, piggy-banking strategies may distort the competitive structure of the
payment system. To the extent that shadow payment systems come to rely on banks to
secure the performance of core functions, this places banks in an advantageous position to
influence the development of what are, in effect, emerging competitors in the payments
industry. Perhaps most importantly, these strategies run the risk of embedding bank
accounts as largely non-substitutable intermediate products, thus exposing shadow
payment systems to potentially acute hold-up problems.196 Under these circumstances, we
might expect banks to extract most of the commercial benefits generated by piggy banking
192. Directive 2015/2366, art. 10(1)(b), 2015 O.J. (L. 337)(EU)
193. See The National Payment System Regulations, L.N. 109 (2014), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 119
§ 25(3)(f), (Kenya). See, e.g., Are Customer Funds Properly Safeguarded?, GSMA,
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/policy-and-regulation/guide/are-
customer-funds-properly-safeguarded/(Last visited Apr.. 18, 2018), Table 1; Jonathan Greenacre & Ross P.
Buckley, Using Trusts to Protect Mobile Money Customers 10 (Singapore J. Legal Stud., Working Paper No.
2015-27, 2014).
194. Although where customers do not have easy access to banking services-as is the case with money
mobile money customers-this may still cause problems.
195. See Kenya Deposit Insurance Act, No. 10 (2012) § 29. Although, as examined in the next Part, this
protection may ultimately prove illusory.
196. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J. L. & EcoN. 233 (1979).
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strategies. Over the longer term, meanwhile, we might expect to see high levels of vertical
integration: with banks acquiring shadow payment systems and integrating them into their
existing business lines. 197 This outcome would be problematic insofar as we think that
banks are poor incubators for socially desirable financial innovation. It would also be
problematic insofar as one of the reasons for the emergence of at least some shadow
payment systems (mobile money platforms, for example) has been the perceived
deficiencies with the conventional banking system.
E. Trust in Trusts
Perhaps the most frequently identified strategy for protecting customer deposits within
the shadow payment system-and especially mobile money platforms-is the use of trusts.
Trusts are used to partition assets in a wide range of commercial contexts.198 As Jonathan
Greenacre and Ross Buckley explain in the context of mobile money platforms, trusts can
be used to ring-fence customer funds, thereby rendering them unavailable for distribution
to creditors in the event of a firm's bankruptcy.199 In the case of mobile money platforms,
institutions performing payment functions could declare themselves a trustee over funds
received in exchange for e-money, with t e funds then held for the benefit of customers
and thus available to meet their demands for convertibility even in the event of the
institution's bankruptcy.200
For this strategy to be effective, the trust must be validly constituted as a matter of
general law.201 It must also be respected under applicable corporate bankruptcy law. On
the former point, some jurisdictions may also require the segregation of funds so that they
are not commingled with the assets of the institution performing payment functions.202 On
the latter point, the most obvious basis on which an otherwise valid trust would not be
respected in bankruptcy proceedings is where the trust's creation is contrary to the relevant
transaction avoidance rules. Where the trust is created by a declaration on the part of the
institution (to the effect that it holds funds it has received on trust for e-money holders),
there may be some risk that the declaration will be susceptible to avoidance as a
197. Id.
198. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Left ofthe Trust: The Trust as an Instrument ofCommerce, 107 YALE
L.J. 165, 179 (1997).
199. Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 193, at 17. Under English law, assets held by a bankrupt debtor on
trust for others are treated as assets unavailable for distribution to creditors in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy,
for the reason that they are owned beneficially-that is, in equity though not in law-by the beneficiaries of the
trust. RoY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw 212-13 (4th ed. 2011).
200. Greenacre & Buckley, supra note 193, at 17.
201. There is of course an a priori question as to whether a "trust" (or an equivalent mechanism, under which
assets held by a debtor can be validly ring-fenced from creditors) is available at all under the applicable law.
202. The position under English law on this question has arguably been relaxed by a series of recent decisions
arising out of the Lehman bankruptcy; for a summary, see THOMAS LEWIN, LEWIN ON TRUSTS 34-40 (19th ed.
2015). Whether the same approach would be taken in other common law systems, or (for trusts or functional
equivalents to trusts) in civil law systems, is an open question; see, e.g., Dorothy Gruyaert & Sander van Loock,
UK Supreme Court Decision on Lehman Brothers Client Money: Equity or Lottery?, 22 EUR. REV. PRiV. L. 217
(2014).
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preference,203 since the effect of the declaration is to convert the position of e-money
holders from that of creditors to that of absolute (equitable) owners.
A potential solution to this problem is to ensure that cash received in exchange for the
issuance of e-money never becomes the beneficial property of the institution: i.e. it is at all
times held on trust for customers. In the case of M-Pesa, this appears to have been achieved
by a more sophisticated trust arrangement han that which could have been achieved by a
simple declaration of trust by the system provider, Safaricom. Under this arrangement,
liquid assets equivalent to the total stock of outstanding M-Pesa are held on trust not by
Safaricom, but by a separately incorporated corporation, M-Pesa Holding Co. Limited.
Safaricom then transacts with upper-tier agents in connection with the issuance and
redemption of M-Pesa as agent for the trustee corporation rather than on its own
account,204 with the effect that all funds received are impressed with the trust from the
outset.
Importantly, while a trust may be effective in shielding assets from the creditors of a
shadow payment system provider, this will not in itself be sufficient to ensure that these
assets can be made available quickly to the trust's beneficiaries in the event of a payment
institution's bankruptcy. Put differently: while trusts may be an effective strategy for
ensuring the storage of customer funds,205 they are unlikely, in and of themselves, to ensure
that customers have adequate liquidity during any bankruptcy process. There will be a
particular risk of delay where the shadow payment system is itself the legal owner of the
assets held in trust for its customers. In many jurisdictions, the effect of the commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings is that the debtor's managers are displaced (or at least restrained
from exercising their management powers). In their place, a bankruptcy practitioner may
be appointed to marshal and preserve the debtor's assets and exercise powers of
management and sale. The applicable corporate bankruptcy law may well recognize the
substantive entitlement of beneficiaries to look (to the exclusion of all others) to assets held
on trust for them by the debtor, but it may also impose a range of procedural obstacles to
the exercise of beneficiary entitlements while the bankruptcy process is pending. The most
obvious of these is a stay or moratorium on enforcement action. Yet even where the
interests held under a trust are not subject to a stay or moratorium, beneficiaries are likely
to suffer delays while the bankruptcy practitioner confirms the existence of a valid trust,
along with the identity and entitlements of beneficiaries.206 Moreover, the costs of the
203. See, e.g., Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd (in administration) [2006] 2 BCLC I (U.K.); cf Re Kayford
Ltd (in liquidation) [1975] 1 WLR 279 (U.K.). The declaration will only be susceptible to avoidance as a
preference if it is made at the relevant ime prior to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, i.e. during the
period of time governed by the applicable preference rule. There is considerable variation across jurisdictions on
the length of this "suspect period." See, e.g., BoB WESSELS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 24 (2009). The other elements of the applicable preference rule must
also be satisfied. These may include a requirement that the debtor is bankrupt at the time of, or in consequence
of, making the declaration.
204. M-PESA, Declaration of Trust in Favour of all M-Pesa Account Holders of Safaricom Limited § 7, (Feb.
23, 2007), https://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/TermsandConditions/M-
PESATrustDeed_23.02.2007.pdf.
205. Assuming, of course, that the trust assets have been properly preserved, and that the cost of the
administration of these assets in the event of bankruptcy are either not significant or not borne by the trust
beneficiaries.
206. In the event that these issues are disputed, the delays may be significant. As the Financial Conduct
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bankruptcy practitioner's work in doing so may be chargeable to trust assets.207 Again, the
M-Pesa trust arrangement offers a possible solution to this problem. As described above,
Safaricom is not the trustee of the assets representing funds received in exchange for the
issue of M-Pesa. Instead, a separately incorporated entity performs this function. This
structural separation should avoid the risk that the bankruptcy of Safaricom could delay the
distribution of trust assets to M-Pesa customers.208
F. Structural Separation
The structure of M-Pesa points to a final and seemingly neglected strategy that shadow
payment systems might employ to protect customers: structural separation. While
structural separation could take many forms, the basic idea is that core payment functions
would be performed by a dedicated bankruptcy remote legal entity, thereby ring-fencing
customer funds from any distribution of assets to other creditors in the event of the parent
firm's bankruptcy. This entity could then be subject to basic forms of prudential regulation
including, for example, portfolio restrictions, private third party insurance, or mandatory
trusteeship. It could also be subject to prudential regulation and supervision by public
regulatory authorities.
Structural separation can be viewed as potentially superior to other strategies for
protecting customer funds in at least three respects. First, where a firm performs core
payment functions in combination with other business activities, structural separation
eliminates the need for customers, other creditors, or prudential supervisors to monitor
these other aspects of the firm's business. It also makes it more straightforward to impose
other prudential regulatory strategies without unnecessarily impacting on the firm's other
business activities. Second, because the ring-fenced entity would be able to continue to
meet its commitments in the event of its parent's bankruptcy, customers would face little
or no risk of illiquidity or loss of value. As a result, there would also be little or no risk of
destabilizing runs or externalities stemming from the inability of customers to pay
creditors, suppliers, or employees. Finally, unlike the simple trust strategy, there is limited
risk of ex post avoidance claims under corporate bankruptcy law. Structural separation is
thus likely to be more effective than trusts as a means of partitioning assets. Together, these
Authority (FCA) observed in its post-Lehman review of the operation of the client assets sourcebook (CASS)
regime in the U.K., there may be a trade-off between making a distribution speedily and making an accurate
distribution; PS14/9. Review of the client assets regime for investment businesses, FCA (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/psl4-9-review-client-assets-regime-investment-business;
See also Jo Braithwaite, Law After Lehmans (London Sch. Econ., Working Paper No.11/2014, 2014) (examining
the impact of the various Lehmans bankruptcy decisions on principles of contractual interpretation and trust and
bankruptcy law).
207. See Re Berkeley Applegate (Investment Consultants) Ltd (No 3) [1989] 5 BCC 803 (Ch). Re Berkeley
Applegate turned on the construction of the remuneration rules for English liquidation proceedings, but has been
applied by analogy in other forms of English insolvency proceedings. The approach to this question varies across
common law jurisdictions; see e.g., the review of Australian authorities In re AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in
liquidation) ACN 093 616 445 (No 2) 2014 NSWSC 1004 13, http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2014/1004.html.
208. A possible alternative, one in fact contemplated by the proposed Kenyan regulations, is to allow the
state to step into the shoes of the trustee. However, this may be less attractive than structural separation insofar
as the trustee is the debtor, as there will be negotiations between the bankruptcy practitioner appointed and the
state over the proper conduct of the debtor's affairs and the distribution of its assets.
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features enhance certainty for customers and promote greater confidence in the credibility
of these systems' commitment to provide storage and liquidity during periods of
institutional and systemic stress. Like portfolio restrictions, however, the ring-fencing of
customer funds envisioned by structural separation necessarily limits the ability of
institutions to engage in other socially useful forms of financial intermediation.
This survey of available strategies reveals a number of potentially significant tradeoffs.
First, while private law strategies based on contract and trusts are likely to give market
participants the most flexibility in designing and updating institutional arrangements in
response to market developments-thereby fostering financial innovation-these
strategies are particularly vulnerable to the strict application of corporate bankruptcy law.
Second, while strategies that rely on banks and bank regulation may offer a high level of
protection to customer funds and insulate the shadow payment system from potential
systemic risks, these strategies run the risk of stifling innovation and competition within
the payments industry. Third, many of the strategies that are likely to prove most effective
in protecting customer funds and ensuring liquidity during periods of institutional stress-
e.g. portfolio restrictions and structural separation-constrain the ability of institutions to
use these funds to make loans and other longer term investments in the real economy. These
trade-offs drive home the reality that there are no free lunches in the design and regulation
of the shadow payment system.
VII. CONCLUSION
When scholars and policymakers examine the functions, operations, and regulation of
modem payment systems they often take for granted that the institutional structure of these
systems is deeply intertwined with the conventional banking system. One of the most
important-and least appreciated-implications of this historical intertwining is that the
unique prudential regulatory regimes governing banks generate important benefits for the
stability of bank-based payment systems. Most importantly, the practical effect of these
regimes is to relax the strict application of general corporate bankruptcy law, thereby
enabling banks and bank-based payment systems to continue to perform their important
economic functions under conditions of severe institutional stress. The emergence of
payment systems that reside outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system thus
raises an important question: how credible is the commitment of these institutions to
continue to perform their core payment functions under the same conditions? This Article
has started the process of mapping the diverse range of institutional arrangements that make
up this shadow payment system. It has identified the risks that this system poses to
customers, along with the risks it may in future pose to financial and economic stability. It
has also examined the effectiveness of some of the strategies that have or might be used to
strengthen the credibility of the commitment to provide storage and liquidity during periods
of institutional and systemic stress. This examination suggests that while these strategies
may provide some degree of protection, there is considerable scope for further
improvement. It also suggests that we have only just started to understand how the shadow
payment system works, how resilient it is likely to be under stress and, thus, how effective
it may prove as a potential substitute for conventional bank-based payment systems.
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